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I. INTRODUCTION
No federal crime has generated more controversy than RICO.' From
ambitious, but narrowly focused beginnings,2 RICO has become a powerful
tool.3 Its amorphous structure has allowed it to be used against many
"deserving" defendants, 4 building political support despite efforts at legislative
reform.5 However, RICO's flexibility comes at a cost. RICO's critics claim
that the statute has been abused, especially by civil RICO plaintiffs attracted by
its treble damages and attorney fee provisions. 6 While the United States
Attorney's office has adopted guidelines to prevent abuse,7 critics claim that the
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). See Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and
Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, passim (1990).
2 See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Cime of Being a Cin'nal, Parts I & 11, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 661, 662 n.7 (1987). See also 116 CoNG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (Rep.
Mikva stated that the purpose of RICO was to control organized crime in the United
States.).
3 See Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAML. REV. 165, 169 nn.10-11 (1980).
4 See Edward S.G. Dennis, jr., Current RICO Policies of the DepartMent of Justice, 43
VAND. L. REV. 651, 674 (1990) (discussing constituencies for RICO). See also G. Robert
Blakey et al., What's Next?: The Future of RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073, 1084
(1990) ("If ever there was a case outside of the organized crime area that seemed
appropriate for RICO prosecution, it is the case against Milken & Drexel." (citing CONNIE
BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 370 (1989))).
5 See William I. Hughes, RICO Reforr How Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV.
639, 642-46 (1990) (discussing the failure of RICO reform). Supporters of RICO reform
include, but are not limited to, the following organizations: The American Bar Association,
National Association of Manufacturers, American Civil Liberties Union, United States
Chamber of Commerce, AFL-CIO, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Securities Industry Association, American Bankers Association, Independent Bankers
Association of America, Future Industries Association, American Council of Life Insurance,
Credit Union National Association, Grocery Manufacturers of America, National
Automobile Dealers Association, State Farm Insurance Companies, Alliance of American
Insurers, and the American Financial Services Association. Il. at 640.6 See Leigh Ann McKenzie, Note, avl RICO: Prior Oiminal Conviction and Burden
of Proof, 60 NOaE DAME L. REV. 566, 572 (1985). Critics claim that RICO encourages
frivolous lawsuits because it offers a private plaintiff the advantages of a federal forum and
the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees. Id.; see also L. Gordon Crovitz, How
the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050, 1065 (1990)
(arguing that the threat of a RICO suit often coerces innocent defendants in a civil suit to
settle).
7 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 665 (discussing approval procedures for government use
of RICO); see generally CRMINAL Div., U.S. DEPT OF JUSTCE, UNTrrED STATES
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government has brought marginal prosecutions, lured by RICO's procedural
advantages and stepped-up penalty provisions.8
The Supreme Court has contributed to the proliferation of RICO cases.
Prior to 1993, when the Court decided Reves v. Ernst & Young,9 the Court had
reviewed only four cases involving RICO's substantive provisions. 10 In all four
cases, the lower federal courts had limited RICO's broad language only to be
reversed by the Supreme Court which adopted broad readings of RICO's
statutory concepts.In
In Reves, the Court, for the first time, affirmed a decision in which a lower
federal court had given a narrowing interpretation to one of RICO's substantive
provisions. 12 Reves held that accountants who prepared an audit report for a
farmers' cooperative did not "conduct" or "participate in the conduct" of the
affairs of the farmers' cooperative for purposes of RICO.13 The Court
purported to rely on RICO's plain language despite the fact that federal circuits
had developed four distinct definitions of "conduct" or "participate in the
conduct." 14 As a result, it is hard to understand Reves as an interpretation of
ArroMEY's MANUAL (1989) (discussing the prima facie case for a RICO violation).
8 S Tarlow, supra note 3, at 170.
9 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (holding that in order for a defendant to be guilty under
RICO he or she must have participated in the operation or management of the enterprise).
10 HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that in order
to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff or prosecutor must show
at least two racketeering predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the
likelihood of continued criminal activity); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985) (holding that there was no support in the statute's history, language, or consideration
of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action could proceed only against a
defendant who has already been criminally convicted. The Court also held that no
"racketeering injury" is required.); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding
that interests subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1976) are not limited to
interests in the enterprise and include "profits" and "proceeds"); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981) (holding that RICO "enterprise" applies to both legitimate and
illegitimate organizations).
II See infra notes 70-111.
12 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173-74, affid sub nom. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937
F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
14 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169; see Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs &
Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222
(1991); Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Scotto,
641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); see a~so Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986). Bank of
Aneica may demonstrate a fifth approach to defining 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) terms "conduct"
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clear statutory language.
Reves is permeated with important policy considerations. For example,
plaintiffs in cases like Reves sue professionals because the primary wrongdoers
are often insolvent.15 The professionals' culpability may be minor when
compared to that of the primary wrongdoers. However, under principles of
joint and several liability, the professionals are still liable for full damages,
trebled. 16 Another unstated concern may have been the expanding use of RICO
in cases involving securities fraud, an area exhaustively regulated by
Congress. 17 Broad interpretation of RICO can threaten "fundamental precepts"
of specialized areas of the law, "dramatically alter[ing] our legal terrain"
without evidence that Congress intended to do so.18 But even judged by the
Court's other RICO decisions, which were usually silent on policy implications
of the Court's holding, Reves left untouched significant policy questions. 19
This Article reviews RICO's treatment in earlier Court decisions to explain
why the Reves Court may have decided to limit RICO. 20 Insofar as Reves was
intended to limit RICO, it takes only a tentative step toward that goal.
Although the Court defined the "conduct" and "participate in the conduct"
language, it did so in a case in which the underlying predicate offenses
involved omission liability under the securities law.21 The Court left
unresolved significant questions involving the breadth of its own decision.22
and "participate in the conduct." Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 970. Bank of America
rejected Bennett's "operation" or "management test"; Bank of America supported its
holding based on the decision in United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 402-03 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 947 (1982), that "conduct" "simply means the performance
of activities necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise." Id It is unclear whether
the test employed in Matino is the same as the test employed in Scotto. Mardno, 648 F.2d
at 402-03.
15 See generally Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168; Bank of America, 782 F.2d at 968 (The
primary wrongdoer, International Horizons, filed for bankruptcy before suit was filed.).
16 See, e.g., Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the nature of the RICO offense mandates joint and several liability), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1074 (1990).
17 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 956-57 (Mikva, ., concurring) (discussing
the extent of federal securities regulation); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Tmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
523 (1985) (Marshall, I., dissenting).18 Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F.2d at 955.
19 See infra part V.B.
20 See infra notes 81-111.
21 See infra notes 147-51.
2 2 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 n.9 (1993). The first question left
open by the Court is the following: While rejecting a restrictive "upper management" test,
the Court left open how far down the ladder liability runs. Id. The Court left open a second
question when it stated in dicta that "[ain enterprise also might be 'operated' or 'managed'
1366 [Vol. 56:1363
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Given the unresolved issues and the Court's unwillingness to address
important policy considerations, lower federal courts and commentators have
differed widely on Reves' meaning.23 This Article examines post-Reves
decisions and argues that courts have demonstrated more hostility towards civil
RICO than fidelity to Reves. This Article highlights two lines of post-Reves
decisions: the first, which reads Reves as having created a rule exempting
providers of professional services from liability under § 1962(c);24 the second,
which interprets Rews as requiring an individual to have responsibility for
directing another person in order to be liable under § 1962(c).25 Both lines of
post-Reves decisions seriously misconstrue Reves and are inconsistent with
RICO's history.
Questions left open by Reves will necessitate a reexamination of the
Court's decision.26 This Article concludes by urging a framework of analysis
for § 1962(c) that would return RICO more closely to specific situations
contemplated by RICO's drafters. 27 Specifically, depending on how the Court
interprets the "operation" part of its "operation or management" test, the Court
may exempt from liability some of the Mafia foot soldiers whom Congress
certainly intended to include within RICO's substantive provisions. 28 This
Article argues that many of the analytical problems under § 1962(c) can be
resolved consistent with legislative history by focusing on the appropriate mens
rea. Imposing a mens rea requirement is consistent with the language and intent
of the statute and provides more comprehensive limitations on RICO than those
by others 'associated with' the enterprise who exert control over it or, for example, by
bribery." Id. at 1173. The observation invites more questions than it answers. For example,
are some bribers so influential that they really manage the enterprise, while other bribers
have too little influence to come within 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)? Or are all bribers who meet
other requirements of § 1962(c) within the Court's management test simply by their act of
bribery? The Court also suggested a third question of uncertainty when it stated that §
1962(c) "cannot be interpreted to reach complete 'outsiders.'" ME At the same time, the
Court stated that § 1962(c) does reach those outsiders who do manage the affairs of the
enterprise. Id. The Court gives little guidance to explain how an outsider may violate §
1962(c) other than by stating that it covers those who manage the enterprise's affairs. ME at
1173, 1178. However, this is a largely circular explanation. The Court also left open
whether a person who does not manage or operate the enterprise may nonetheless be found
liable as an accomplice or co-conspirator. Id. at 1169-70.
23 See infra part VI.
24 See infra part VI.A.
25 See infra part VI.B.
26 See G. Robert Blakey & Marc Haefner, Did Reves Give Professionals a Safe-
Harbor Under RICO?, Crv. RICO REp., Aug. 11, 1993, at 1.
27 See infra part VII.
28 See infra part ]f.
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imposed by Rews' tortured analysis. 29
HI. RICO IN CONGRESS
RICO grew out of almost twenty years of concern about the Mafia's
influence. Congressional interest in the Mafia in America began in earnest in
the early 1950s with Senate hearings chaired by Estes Kefauver. 30 His
committee concluded that "[tihere is a Nation-wide crime syndicate known as
the Mafia, whose tentacles are found in many large cities." 31 That view was
confirmed in November 1957, when New York police broke up a meeting of
Mafia family bosses being held at a Mafioso's estate in Apalachin, New
York.32
In the early 1960s, Congress received additional confirmation of the
existence and power of the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra when Mafioso Joseph
Valachi turned informant. Valachi's story became part of the national
understanding of La Cosa Nostra with the publication of Peter Maas' best seller
The Valachi Papers.33 The Valachi Papers demonstrated that the evil created
by the Mafia was not simply the commission of discrete criminal acts. The
Mafia was a way of life, involving individuals initiated into a structured life of
crime, sworn to commit murder in the name of business.34 Mafia members
demonstrated flexibility in making money, whether by cheating the government
29 See infra part VII.
3 0 SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, 3D INTERiM REP., S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951) (known
as the Kefauver Commission).
31 THE PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFoRcEMN AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED Ciuvm 1 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT] (citing SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COmMRCE, 3D INTERiMREP., S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951)).
3 2 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 32; see also United States v. Bonanno,
683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
3 3 pETER MAAS, THE VALACM PApERS (1968); see Wendy Smith, How Tne Has
Dimirshed the Clout of Capone, NEWSDAY, July 3, 1989, at 4 (identifying The Valachi
Papers as a best selling book).
3 4 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1 n.2 (describing that the core of
organized crime is the supplying of illegal goods and services-gambling, loan sharking,
narcotics, and other forms of vice-to countless numbers of citizen customers) (citing
Johnson, Organized Cime: iallenge to the American Legal System (pts. 1-3), 53 J. CRIM.
L., L. & P.S. 399, 402-04 (1962), 54 J. C~iM. L., L. & P.S. 1, 127 (1963)). But
organized crime is also extensively and deeply involved in legitimate business and in labor
unions. TASK FORCEREPORT, supra note 31, at 1 n.2.
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during wartime by selling black-market gasoline rations, by running illegal
gambling or prostitution operations, or by selling drugs.35
In 1965, President Johnson signed an executive order creating the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
(the Katzenbach Commission) to study organized crime.36 The Katzenbach
Commission's report led to the eventual passage of The Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 and presents strong evidence of the evil that Congress
attempted to address when it enacted RICO. 37
The Katzenbach Commission, although not without some vacillation,
focused on "an entity with particular members, a defined hierarchy, and even
an official name." 38 La Cosa Nostra was not only dangerous because of its size
but also because of its infiltration into legitimate businesses and into labor
organizations. The Commission's report was not concerned generally with the
cost of crime on American society but specifically with the special harm
associated with organized crime that used its economic power to "undermine
free competition." 39 Organized crime was especially dangerous because it
sought monopoly power by force and by investment in "legitimate, [economic],
and political activities." 40
The Commission went beyond the stereotype of the Mafia as
35 See MAAS, supra note 33, at 185-94.
36 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 666; TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1.
37 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 666.
38 Id. at 668.
Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24 groups
operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Their membership is
exclusively Italian, they are in frequent communication with each other, and their
smooth functioning is ensured by a national body of overseers.... FBI intelligence
indicates that the organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La
Cosa Nostra.
Id. (citing TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6--10).
3 9 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 5; see also Johnson, Organized Crime:
Challenge to the American Legal System (pt. 1), 53 J. CRim. L., L. & P.S. 399, 406-07;
Lynch, supra note 2, at 669; RONALD GoLDsTocK, NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME
TASK FORCE, INTERIM REPORT, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERIG IN THE NEw YoRKc CrrY
CONSTRUCrION INDUSTRY 8 (1987) (presenting dramatic evidence of the continuing
economic power of organized crime). Donald Cressey's working paper was more specific:
"The danger of organized crime arises because the vast profits acquired from the sale of
illicit goods and services are being invested in licit enterprises, in both the business sphere
and the governmental sphere." Donald R. Cressey, The Functions and Structure of Criminal
Syndicates, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 25.
4 0 Cressey, supra note 39, at 25.
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unsophisticated hoodlums. The Mafia had matured so that it no longer had to
rely as much as it once did on "hoods." It ran its affairs "more like a big
business, a cartel." 41 The Commission underscored that the Mafia's economic
success was the result not only of muscle and murder but also of power gained
through monopolization, tax evasion, 42 real estate ventures,43 and manipulation
of law enforcement and the courts. 44 The wealth generated by such illegal
activities was estimated to be in the billions of dollars. The Commission's
report left no question that "[tlo succeed in such ventures, [the Mafia] uses
accountants, attorneys, and business consultants, who in some instances work
exclusively on its affairs." 45 As explained by Donald Cressey, the maturation
of the Mafia required ceding power to professionals.46
While the Katzenbach Commission made no recommendations for
substantive reform,47 the substantive RICO offenses were the culmination of a
series of proposed bills. 48 Early in the legislative process, Senator Hruska
introduced two bills, "generally considered ancestors of RICO." 49 In
introducing the legislation, he identified organized crime, the monolithic Mafia,
as a specific evil to be combated by that legislation. 50 Similar to the Katzenbach
Commission, his other primary concern was the infiltration of legitimate
businesses, even though his proposed legislation was not narrowly confined to
the evils that he decried. 51
During the next Congress, Senator McClellan introduced legislation also
based on the Katzenbach Commission report, emphasizing procedural and
evidentiary reform. Like Senator Hruska and the Commission, Senator
McClellan identified the primary evils to be twofold: the threat of the
41 Id. at 53. According to Cressey, "[w]e are now witnessing the passing of the days
when the rulers of organized crime had to devote most of their time and intelligence to
insuring that their members were not bad criminals." Id.
42 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1.
43 See id. at 4; see also MAAS, supra note 33, at 185-94; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54
(describing the role of the "Money Mover" whose role was to launder illicit profits into
other investments including "[i]mporting, real estate, trust funds, books, stocks and
bonds").
44 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 8.
4 5 Id. at 4.
46 See Cressey, supra note 39, at 51.
4 7 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 16. The laws of conspiracy have
provided an effective substantive tool to confront the criminal groups. Id.
4 8 Id.
49 Lynch, supra note 2, at 673.
50 See id.
51 See .at 674.
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monolithic Mafia and its infiltration into legitimate businesses. 52
RICO was largely modeled on a bill proposed in 1969 by Senators Hruska
and McClellan. 53 The bill, according to Senator McClellan, was aimed at
ridding organized crime of its influence over legitimate businesses. 54 A
universal agreement exists that organized crime, and specifically the Mafia, was
the primary target of the legislation.55 Despite these concerns, RICO as enacted
contains neither a definition of organized crime,56 nor specific language
limiting RICO to infiltration of legitimate businesses. 57
Perhaps because the task seemed daunting,58 Congress did not attempt to
define in general terms the structural features of organized crime.59 Instead,
RICO outlawed what the Mafia did, 60 but the functional approach to
criminalizing organized crime invited an open-ended statute.61 If nothing else
was learned from The Valachi Papers and hearings into the conduct of the
Mafia, it was that the Mafia was enormously adaptable, adopting almost any
strategy to make money. 62 RICO would be rendered ineffective if organized
crime was defined in terms of the old standby crimes associated with the Mafia,
crimes like prostitution, gambling and murder for hire. The Mafia would
simply move its operation into new money-making ventures. 63
52 See id. at 675.
53 See id. at 676.
54 See id. at 677.
55 See id. at 669 (identifying that the primary target of RICO was organized crime).
56 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 247 (1989).
57 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1981) ("Undoubtedly, the
infiltration of legitimate business was of great concern.... "). With regard to the organized
crime limitation, RICO almost necessarily had to be defined in broad terms. As pointed out
by Attorney General Katzenbach, outlawing membership in La Cosa Nostra would almost
certainly violate the Constitution. Crovitz, supra note 6, at 1052.
58 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 685; Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Ginns
Multiplication Approach: An Alternative Measurement of Damages Under Cvil RICO, 33
VILL. L. REV. 239, 241 n.12 (1988) ("RICO's drafters consciously avoided defining suct
terms as 'organized crime' or 'organized criminal' for both practical and strategic reasons.
Practically, such a definition was thought to be fraught with constitutional and even racial
difficulties .... ).
59 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 687-88.
60 See id. at 669, 920, 930.
61 See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-5. Senator McClellan stated
that organized criminals are "sufficiently resourceful" to make impossible "an effective
statute that reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does no
include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." 11f
CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970).
62 See MAAS, supra note 33, at 185-94.
63 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-5; see also Cressey, supra note 39, a
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Subsequent debate about RICO has focused on whether Congress intended
to limit its application to organized crime. 64 However, Congress had a distinct
impression of how the Mafia was organized and conducted its business.
65
Congress clearly intended to criminalize that conduct. 66 Debate over whether
RICO is limited to organized crime has been heated, 67 but it has never been
doubted that organized crime, that is, the Mafia, was its primary target.
III. RICO IN THE COURTS
Plaintiffs and prosecutors were slow to use RICO, probably because they
assumed that RICO was limited to organized crime's infiltration into legitimate
businesses. 6 8 When that changed in the nid-1970s, 69 courts divided on RICO's
application. A number of lower federal courts attempted to limit RICO. For
example, some lower federal courts found that RICO required a showing that
the defendant was engaged in organized crime.70 Other lower federal courts
held that RICO was inapplicable to wholly illegitimate businesses. 71 Other
federal courts held that for purposes of § 1962(c), a prosecuting party had to
demonstrate that the racketeering business was operated for economic gain.
72
Still other federal courts limited RICO's application by defining "pattern"
51-56; Lynch, supra note 2, at 684, 687.64 Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, racdical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769, 802 (1990).65 See supra part J.
66 United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 900 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576
(1981).
67 See generally Blakey et al., supra note 4, at 1073.
68 See Dennis, supra note 4, 673-74.
6 9 Id.
70 The following courts held that only those activities with some connection to
organized crime may be the subject of civil RICO suits. See Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards,
Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23,
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 905-06 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding
that a RICO indictment against someone participating in only criminal activities was
invalid), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); see also United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001,
1006-09 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
72 See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.) (holding that for
purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward an economic goal), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 944 (1988); see also United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 53 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
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restrictively2 3
Those decisions could cite ample legislative history that identified the
specific goals of RICO's drafters and could plausibly conclude that a narrow
interpretation of the statute was necessary to limit RICO to those goals. 74
Further, the cases before the courts often posed difficult policy questions
militating in favor of imposing limitations on RICO. For example, in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Second Circuit recognized that a broad reading of
RICO would allow plaintiffs to "bring into federal courts many claims formerly
subject only to state [court] jurisdiction, and to bypass remedial schemes
created by Congress." 75 The Sedina court was also concerned that a liberal
interpretation would result in a significant shift in federal-state relations without
clear legislative intent supporting that shift.7 6
The First Circuit identified similar policy concerns in United States v.
Turkette.7 In holding that § 1962(c) applied only to the operation of a
legitimate business through a pattern of racketeering, the court rejected the
government's "simplistic and literal interpretation" of the law.78 The Turkette
court explained that adopting the government's approach to the definition of a
RICO enterprise would make RICO boundless and would allow prosecutors to
usurp state criminal law jurisdiction because it would equate a RICO violation
to nothing more than a state law conspiracy. 79 As the court in Sedima, the
Turkete court was not willing to infer such a result without stronger evidence
of congressional intent to alter federal and state law enforcement
responsibilities.80
Despite important policy concerns, efforts to limit RICO met with no
success in the Supreme Court. Prior to Reves, the Court decided four cases
interpreting RICO's substantive provisions; in each, the lower federal courts
73 See, e.g., HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
74 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985); see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984).
75 741 F.2d at 486, rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
76 See id.; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (1983);
RICO Cases Committee, A Comprehensive Perspective on Cvil and Qirrinal RICO
Legislation and Litigation, 1985 A.B.A. SEc. CIM. JusT. 8.
77 632 F.2d 896, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
78Id. at 903.
79 See id. at 904.
S0 See i.; Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, (1auffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639,
913 F.2d 948, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cet. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991) (expressing
concern that the broad interpretation of RICO may "work a major restructuring of our legal
landscape"); see also Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643-44 (C.D. Cal.
1983).
13731995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
limited RICO, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court.81 Turkette82 was the
first RICO case decided by the Court and would set the tone for the Court's
later RICO cases.
The First Circuit in Turkette held that a RICO enterprise encompassed only
legitimate enterprises, not wholly illicit ones.8s That holding found support in
RICO's history84 and in § 1961(4) of the Act, which states that "enterprise"
includes any partnership or corporation or any "other legal entity,"85 all of
which are presumptively legitimate organizations. The First Circuit also
supported its holding in Turkette by reference to concerns about federal-state
relations and the almost boundless effect of reading RICO literally.8 6
The Supreme Court gave short shrift to the policy concerns expressed by
the First Circuit in Thrkette. The Court acknowledged that infiltration of
legitimate organizations was RICO's primary but not exclusive goal.87 In
reversing the First Circuit, the Court relied almost exclusively on RICO's
broad language and found no support in the plain language of the statute to
support a distinction between illegitimate and legitimate enterprises.8 8 The
Court found support in the legislative history that Congress considered and
rejected concerns about intrusion into state criminal law enforcement areas. 89
The Court did not address the additional concern about the boundless nature of
81 See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (holding that in
order to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, a plaintiff or prosecutor must
show at least two racketeering predicates that are related and that amount to, or threaten the
likelihood of, continued criminal activity); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Jnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985) (holding that there was no support in the statute's history, language, or
considerations of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action could
proceed only against a defendant who had already been criminally convicted. Thus, given
the facts, Sedima's action was not barred. The Court also concluded that no "racketeering
injury" is required.); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (holding that interests
subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) are not limited to interests in the
enterprise and include "profits" and "proceeds"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981) (holding that RICO "enterprise" applies to both legitimate and illegitimate
organizations).
82 452 U.S. at 576.
83 See Turkette, 632 F.2d at 909.
84 S ji at 901-02.
85 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1984). In the most significant scholarly article examining
RICO's history, Professor Lynch concluded, consistent with the First Circuit's holding in
Turkette, that Congress intended to reach only legitimate organizations. Lynch, supra note
2, at 675-77.86 Turkete, 632 F.2d at 903.
87 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981).
88Id. at 590.
89 Id. at 586.
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RICO, other than to suggest in passing that RICO was intended "to ...
eradicate... organized crime in America." 9°
Had the Court adopted the First Circuit's view, RICO would have been a
minor device in the prosecutor's arsenal. However, by 1981, prosecutors had
discovered that RICO was an effective crime fighting weapon against all kinds
of defendants. 91 RICO would have been severely limited because most RICO
prosecutions involve wholly illegitimate or largely illegitimate associations of
individuals.92 That may explain but does not justify ignoring legislative history
and other significant policy concerns raised by a broad reading of RICO. The
Court's liberal construction of RICO also contributed to the proliferation of
RICO actions.
The idea that RICO may be limited to organized crime was short lived. In
Sedina, the Second Circuit found that a civil RICO plaintiff could bring an
action only after a defendant had been convicted on criminal charges and could
recover only for a "racketeering injury." 93 The Second Circuit, in Sedima, had
adopted the "racketeering injury" limitation to prevent RICO's "extraordinary,
if not outrageous" 94 uses and to bring its application in line with RICO's
general purposes. The Supreme Court rejected the limitations imposed by the
Second Circuit. 95
The Court relied on RICO's literal language and broad remedial purposes.
However, now it found that RICO was "an aggressive initiative to... develop
90 Id. at 589. Russello made a similar suggestion that RICO might be limited to
organized crime. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 24 (1983). However, as in
Turkette, Pmello gave a broad reading to the statutory term under consideration. Id.
91 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 662; Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
488 (1985).
92 See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster
Efforts to Rewrte RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the
End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 896 (1990). As overheard on a wiretap, one
mobster explained the meaning of RICO to a cohort: "[1f they don't prove that a legitimate
business was infiltrated we're off the hook .... We can do anything we want. They can
stick RICO .... I wouldn't be in a legitimate business for all the fuckin' money in the
world to begin with." Id. at 869 n.12 (quoting G. O'NEILL & D. LEHR, Tim UNDERBoSs:
THE RIsE AND FALL OFAMARAFAMILY 233 (1989)).
93 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479 (1985). That limitation was not specifically rejected until HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). However, the Court's reasoning in Sedhia made clear that
such a limitation would fail. Sedina, 473 U.S. at 479. See infra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text.
94 Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
95 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481.
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new methods for fighting crime," not necessarily organized crime.96 The Court
found few statements in the legislative history relating to this general goal of
fighting crime, but the Court found this goal inherent in the "overall approach"
of the statute and in statements made by RICO's opponents that it would be too
easy a weapon against "innocent businessmen." 97 The evolution of RICO into
something apart from its original intent was a function of the breadth of
RICO's provisions. The earlier suggestion that RICO would be limited to
organized crime disappeared after Sedhna.98 If RICO was being abused, relief
would have to come from Congress, not the Court.99 As in Tirkette, the Court
in Sedima gave short shrift to policy concerns that had troubled the lower
federal court.
The Court did suggest, however, that lower federal courts might limit
RICO through the "pattern of racketeering" element. The Court observed
specifically that the "'extraordinary' uses" to which plaintiffs had put civil
RICO were a result of "the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a
meaningfid concept of 'pattern.'"' 10 The Eighth Circuit attempted to do just
that. In Superior Oil Co. v. Fidmer,1°0 the court found that "pattern" required
more than one continuing criminal scheme and observed that "[i]t places a real
strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by
several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern' of racketeering activity." 102
The Supreme Court rejected that argument in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co.103 The Court's starting point was the language of the Act.
"Pattern," according to the Court, requires some relationship plus
continuity. 104 The Court relied on Tite X of the Organized Crime Control Act
for a definition of "relationship": "criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
events."
0 5
961Id.at 498.
97 Id.
98 See i& at 479. While the Court did not have to resolve whether RICO was limited to
organized crime, much of its reasoning demonstrated that the argument would fil. That
proposed limitation was finally laid to rest in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229 (1989).
99 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493.
100 Id. at 500.
101 785 F.2d 252, 258 (8th Cir. 1986).
102 Id. at 257 (citing Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp.
828, 832 (N.D. IM. 1985)).
103 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
10 4 See id. at 237-39.
105 Id. at 240.
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In discussing the continuity requirement, the Court rejected the Eighth
Circuit's test of multiple schemes, though it stated that proof of multiple
schemes would be "highly relevant." 1°6 The Court found the Eighth Circuit's
approach too rigid and unsupported by RICO's legislative history. The Eighth
Circuit, stated Justice Brennan, defined continuity "by introducing a concept-
the 'scheme'-that appears nowhere in the language or legislative history of the
Act." 10 7 The Court also expressed doubts whether the "scheme" element
would add certainty to an understanding of the "pattern" element.108
Despite the Court's statement that RICO's legislative history lacked
support for the Eighth Circuit's requirement of multiple "schemes," RICO's
legislative history does support such a requirement. Senator McClellan and
others in Congress insisted that RICO was inapplicable to sporadic criminal
conduct. 109 While a single scheme might involve multiple acts over a long
period of time, Congress enacted RICO after consideration of the special evil
represented by organized crime. Organized crime represented a threat to our
national economic well-being because racketeers generated enormous illicit
profits through widespread criminal activities and used economic power to
develop monopoly power. o10 Mafiosi made crime a way of life, perpetrating
multiple criminal schemes."'
Prior to Reves, the Supreme Court consistently rejected efforts by the
lower federal courts to narrow RICO. Reliance on broad new statutory terms
invited "creative" uses of RICO, however, the Court stated explicitly that
reform had to come from Congress.
IV. REVEs v. ERNST & YOUNG
Two of the Supreme Court's four RICO decisions produced sharp division
within the Court. Sedima was decided by a 5-4 majority with a strong dissent
10 6 Id.
107 Id. at 241.
108 See id. at 253. There is some irony in Justice Brennan's view that the single-
scheme concept would add confusion to the law. He has proposed a similar test in cases
involving multiple prosecutions when the accused has claimed a violation of double
jeopardy. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 449 (1970) (Brennan, I., concurring)
(arguing that the Court should adopt a same transaction test for cases in which a defendant
relies on collateral estoppel); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (majority opinion
authored by Brennan) (holding that a subsequent prosecution arising out of the "same
conduct" as an earlier prosecution violated double jeopardy).
109 See John L. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which
Threatens Qvil Liberies?, 46 NoTRE DANE L. REV. 55, 62, 142-43 (1970).
110 See supra notes 39-45.
111 See supra notes 39-63.
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by Justice Marshall. 112 While the result in H.J. Inc. was unanimous, it
produced Justice Scalia's scathing concurring opinion in which he and three
other justices suggested that RICO may be unconstitutionally vague. 113
By 1993, three of the dissenting justices in Sedina had retired from the
Court. At least five sitting justices, however, had expressed grave misgiving
about RICO.114 H.J. Inc. may have been a wakeup call that the Court was
concerned about the uncontrolled use of RICO. 115 In Sedima, the Court had
invited Congress to narrow RICO; Congress had failed to do so.116 Important
professional associations, including the American Bar Association, publicized
concerns about RICO's breadth. 117 Groups with widely different political
agendas called for RICO's reform.' 1 8
Finally, in 1993, the Court decided a case in which it adopted a lower
federal court's narrowing interpretation of RICO's broad language. In Reves,
112 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (Marshall, Brennan,
Blackmun & Powell, 31., dissenting) (5-4 decision).
113 HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (9-0 decision).
Despite the view of four justices, RICO would almost certainly withstand a vagueness
challenge. See, e.g., Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note, "Mother of Mercy-Is This The End of
RICO?"-Juatice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO
Pattern", 65 NOmE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990); see also Frank C. Razzant, RICO
Constitutionaliy: Multiffactor Test Gets Top Marks, 1 NAT'L ITALiAN AM. BAR Assc. J. 79
(1991). Since H.J. Inc., courts are virtually unanimous that RICO is not unconstitutionally
vague. l
114 The five justices include the four justices concurring in H.J. Inc. and Justice
Blackmun, who joined Justice Marshall's dissent in Se&m. See supra notes 112-13.
115 The view that Reves represents a new concern with an overbroad interpretation of
RICO may be undercut by the Court's decision the following term in NOW, Inc. v.
Schiedler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). In NOW, Inc., the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
holding that a RICO enterprise had to have an economic motive. The result in Schiedler was
unanimous and, as I have argued elsewhere, was an easy case in light of earlier Supreme
Court decisions. Michael Vitiello, Has the Supreme Court Really Turned RICO Upside
Down?: An Examination of NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 85 1. CRiM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
1223 (1995). For example, Turkette was directly on point. In both cases, the litigant argued
that the court should impose a requirement on the term "enterprise" not found in the
statute's express language. As in Turkette, the Court in NOW, Inc. rejected that argument.
See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 910 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576
(1981); NOW, Inc., 114 S. Ct. at 789.
ll6 See supra notes 96-99.
117 See RICO Cases Committee, supra note 76, at 9 (listing Department of Justice, the
National Chamber of Commerce, and the Judicial Conference of the United States as
supporters of RICO when introduced).
118 See supra note 5.
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plaintiff investors purchased notes of a farmers' cooperative. 119 The defendant
accounting firm was hired to audit the Co-op.120 The Co-op was in bad
financial shape resulting from mismanagement and fraud of the Co-op's general
manager and its accountant. 121 The Co-op's solvency at the time of the audit
was dependent on how the auditors valued a gasohol plant sold to the Co-op by
its general manager.122
The investors' claim against the accounting firm was based on the auditors'
failure to tell the Co-op board of the Co-op's insolvency and on the auditors'
misleading presentation at the Co-op board's 1982 and 1983 annual
meetings. 123 Although the plaintiffs prevailed at trial on state and federal
securities fraud theories, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the RICO claim and dismissed it.124
The complaint alleged a violation of § 1962(c), that the auditors
"conducted or participated in the affairs of the Co-op, committing both mail
fraud and securities fraud." 25 The district court relied on the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Bennett v. Berg,126 interpreting § 1962(c) as requiring that the RICO
defendant participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
The court of appeals affirmed. '27 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Eighth Circuit. 128
The Court began its analysis by explaining that § 1962(c) includes a
repetition of the word "conduct," used both as a verb and as a noun. Section
1962(c) states that it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering." 129 In
Reves, the auditors were associated with the enterprise and the Co-op, and
participated in these affairs by preparing an audit and speaking at the annual
meetings. The Court concluded that this was insufficient to bring the
defendants within § 1962(c). 130
The verb "to conduct," according to the majority, means "to lead, run,
119 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 (1993). See also Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991).
120 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168.
121 jrd at 1166-67.
122 ld. at 1167; Reves, 937 F.2d at 1317.
123 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1167-68 (discussing liability based on failure to act).
124 Id at 1168.
125 Reves, 937 F.2d at 1323.
126 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1984).
127 Reves, 937 F.2d at 1324.
128 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1174.
129 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
130 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
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manage, or direct," and thus "indicates some degree of direction." 13 1
Accordingly, § 1962(c) could not be read to mean only that an actor violated
the section by participating in the affairs of the enterprise because that would
render superfluous the noun "conduct." 132 If mere participation was intended
to be enough, Congress would have made it unlawful to participate in the
affairs of an enterprise, not to participate in ihe conduct of its affairs. 133 Hence,
when used as a noun as well, "'conduct' . . include[s] an element of
direction."134
The Court also had to define the meaning of "participate." That term might
mean nothing more than to render some assistance or to aid and abet, not
requiring any management or control over the affairs of the enterprise. Instead,
when read in context, one has to participate in the conduct of the affairs. But
that is something less than a requirement that one conduct the affairs of the
enterprise. When read along with the phrase, "directly or indirectly," it was
clear to the Court "that RICO liability is not limited to those with a formal
position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise's affairs is
required." 135 According to the majority, the "operation or management" test
describes § 1962(c)'s meaning and "is easy to apply." 36
V. ANALYSIS OF REvEs
Reves has produced confusion among lower federal courts. 137 What
compounds the post-Reves confusion is the Supreme Court's analysis of its own
test in relation to the facts of the case, a case involving omission liability under
the securities laws. The Court decided an unusually narrow case in which its
test was easily met.138 But the Court left unresolved a number of significant
questions, suggesting that its test is not easily applied, a conclusion supported
by post-Reves litigation. 139
The Reves Court's analysis of the convoluted statutory language produced
widely different interpretations among lower federal courts. Furthermore, the
Court refused to apply its test to difficult facts, inviting litigation in the wake of
131 Id. at 1169.
1 3 2 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1170 (footnote omitted).
136 Id. The Court found additional support in the legislative history for its conclusion.
ld. 137 See infra notes 190-281 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
139 See infra notes 190-281 and accompanying text.
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its decision. But Reves is dissatisfying for an additional reason. In light of
public criticism of RICO and efforts at legislative reform, 140 the Court must
have been aware of significant policy questions implicated in Reves. But even
judged by its own unwillingness to address policy issues in its prior RICO
cases, Reves is singularly unilluminating on those issues.
That Reves is the first decision upholding a narrow construction of RICO's
broad language may signal that the Court is troubled by issues raised by lower
federal courts, 141 the ABA, 142 and other prominent critics of RICO. 143 Given
its position in cases like Sedima, the Court may have failed to articulate its
views on those policy questions because in cases prior to Reves the Court left
itself little maneuvering room. The Court has been loathe to overrule precedent
in statutory construction cases. 144 Addressing the underlying policy concerns in
Reves may have demonstrated that the Court now disagrees with its own
holding in Sedina or at least with its unwillingness to limit RICO consistently
with the policy concerns expressed by the Second Circuit. 145 But Reves was a
blueprint for confusion because of its narrow holding, its refusal to address a
number of more complicated questions raised but not resolved by its decision,
and its total silence on its view of the policy questions implicated in Reves. 14 6
A. Reves as an Omission-Liability Case
After construing the "plain meaning" of § 1962(c), Reves applied its own
test to the facts before it. The Court found that the only basis for a finding that
the auditors "participated" would have been in their failure to tell the board
that the plant should have been valued differently. 147 That failure did not
14OS supra note 5.
141 See supra part In.
142 See RICO Cases Committee, supra note 76, at 9.
143 See supra note 5.
144 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938). This is not a rule without exception. See, e.g.,
Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1994).
145 The Second Circuit was concerned about "outrageous" uses of RICO and the
federalization of wide areas of common law fraud. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). By analogy, in Reves, the Court
may have been concerned about routinely converting securities fraud cases into RICO
actions, thereby altering the existing technical scheme of securities laws without clear
evidence that Congress intended to alter the securities laws when it enacted RICO. Similar
arguments were unavailing in Sedima. In the interim, Congress had been unable to reform
RICO.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 152-89.
147 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1174 (1993).
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amount to the operation or management of the Co-op's affairs. The Court
rejected the dissent's argument that the auditors exercised management or
control by preparing the financial statement, a responsibility considered to be
managerial in nature. 148 Thus, Reves may be read simply as a case of a
culpable omission. On that reading, one who fails to act cannot be said to
"participate in the conduct of the affairs" of the relevant enterprise. 149
Had the auditors prepared the misleading summaries or had the plaintiffs'
claim for relief relied on misleading statements made by a representative of the
accounting firm (rather than a failure to disclose information), or had a
representative of the accounting firm made misleading statements at the board
meeting, the Court may have found sufficient participation in the conduct of the
Co-op's affairs. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's statements that
professional standards permit accountants to rely on information given them by
their clients and that the audit report did reveal the basis upon which the
gasohol plant had been evaluated. 150 As characterized by the Court, Reves is
not a case in which the auditors affirmatively deceived the public; instead, their
culpability was based on their failure to correct misleading information
prepared by others. 151
B. Reves and Unstated Policy Concerns
In Sedima, the Second Circuit was concerned that without limitations
imposed, RICO would convert garden variety common law fraud into a federal
right of action with stepped up damages and attorneys' fees available to
148 Id. at 1167.
149 Support for this narrow view of Reves is found in the Eighth Circuit's discussion of
auditors' liability under federal securities laws. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F.2d 1310,
1314 (8th Cir. 1991). The parties treated the basis of auditors' liability under Rule lOb-5 as
omission liability. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Liability under Rule
10b-5 turned on the finding that auditors' had a duty to disclose to the investors that the
financial summaries prepared by the Co-op were misleading. Reves, 937 F.2d at 1329-30.
The financial reports prepared by the auditors did include a discussion of how the auditors
determined the valuation of the gasohol plant. Id. at 1317-18. The Court did not explicitly
limit Reves to cases involving omission liability. I have argued in this Article that such a
limitation is implicit in part of the Court's analysis. Because the limitation was implicit, the
Court did not address why RICO might not extend liability to omissions whereas the
criminal law typically does so. Cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding that
§ 301(K) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act creates liability for a failure to
ensure against violations of the Act).
15 0 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173-74.
151 Id.
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successful plaintiffs. 152 The Supreme Court found that concern unavailing and
concluded, instead, that any change must come from Congress. 153
Despite considerable pressure to reform RICO after Sedima,154 Congress
has not acted. 155 RICO has produced extraordinary political alignments. 156
RICO's equal availability to criminal and civil defendants may explain the
alliance of liberal groups urging RICO's reform like the ACLU aligning with
pro-business groups like the National Association of Manufacturers and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The wide array of political
interests aligned on both sides of the debate may explain Congress' inability to
reform RICO. With Congress suffering gridlock, pressure on the Supreme
Court to limit RICO may have mounted.
Reves posed some of the same concerns present in Sedima. Reves was
another decision in which professionals were drawn into civil litigation because
the primary perpetrator of a fraudulent scheme was judgment proof.157 It was
another case in which RICO was used to treble damages even though no similar
damages would have been available for the underlying fraud. 158 In cases like
Sedina and Reves, plaintiffs have relied on securities, mail or wire fraud as the
underlying predicate offenses to turn the professionals' conduct into a federal
right of action. 159 Mail fraud is actionable only when it is part of a RICO
"pattern of racketeering." 160 Securities fraud, even if actionable, provides more
limited damages than a RICO violation. 161
In a related context, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the
"significant control" test.162 In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Otauffeurs
& Helpers Local Union 639, the court limited RICO because "[a] broader
152 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473
U.S. 479 (1985).
153 Sedimna, 473 U.S. at 499.
154 See, e.g., Susan Getzendanner, "Judicial Pruning' of "Garden Variety Fraud"
Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work. It's Tne for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673,
678 (1990) (for one example of criticism of RICO).
155 See Hughes, supra note 5, at 642-46 (discussing the failure of RICO reform).
156 See supra note 5.
157 Ralph A. Pitts et al., avi/ RICO and Professional Liability after Reves: Paint
Will Have to Look Elsewhere to Reach the "Deep Pockets" of Outside Professionals (Part 1
of2), Civ. RICO REP., Oct. 13, 1993, at 1.
158 The Supreme Court had already ruled that the notes were securities within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 71 (1990).
159 Getzendanner, supra note 154, at 678-79.
160 Id. at 676.
161 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r (1983) liability for misleading statements).
162 Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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reading of section 1962(c) would... work a major restructuring of our legal
landscape."' 63 In Yellow Bus Lines, the plaintiff sued the defendant union and
its business agent and trustee. The plaintiff attempted to state a § 1962(c) claim
against the union based on events surrounding a strike for union recognition. 164
The narrow test was warranted, according to the court, because to hold
otherwise would upset the balance that Congress had struck in its extensive
legislation in labor-management relations.165
Judge Mikva concurred in the en banc decision. 166 But he raised the point,
alluded to above, that in light of cases like Sedima, it may be too late to limit
RICO to avoid conflict with other areas of the law. Just as a contrary holding
in Yellow Bus Lines, would "'RICOize" labor law, "Sedima has already
federalized many aspects of state fraud law." 167 That is, Judge Mikva doubted
that principled lines could be drawn to prevent RICO from spilling over into
other specialized areas of the law. Sedima had rejected such an effort by the
Second Circuit. 168
Cases like Reves have the effect of "RICOizing" federal securities law, 169
while cases like Sedina have the effect of "RICOizing" and federalizing state
fraud claims in cases in which the use of the mails converts local fraud into
mail fraud, which in turn becomes actionable in civil cases only through
RICO. 170 Unless the Court was willing to undercut the reasoning in Sedina,
the Court could not state its concern in Reves about using RICO in securities
fraud cases, an area in which Congress has already heavily legislated. 171
Litigation in fraud cases also presents troubling proof problems. For
example, in some cases, accountants or lawyers may be charged with mail
fraud based on dissemination of misinformation through the mails. 172 But the
lawyer, accountant or other professional may have been negligent, rather than
willful, in preparing a document. For example, in a number of cases,
professionals have been charged with fraud based on touting a tax shelter
eventually disallowed by the IRS. 173 But the representation that the tax shelter
was sound may have been based on ignorance or bad judgment rather than on
163 Ij. at 955.
164 Id. at 950.
165 Id. at 955.
166 Id. at 956 (Mikva, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 957 (Mikva, j., concurring).
168 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
169 See Crovitz, supra note 6, at 1058-59.
170 See Getzendanner, supra note 154, at 680-81.
171 See &eda, 473 U.S. at 504-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172 See, e.g., Sassoon v. Altgelt, 777, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. 11. 1993).
173 See, e.g., Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1993).
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an intent to defraud. Negligence or malpractice is not mail fraud because there
is no intent to defraud. 174 But the mens rea of mail fraud may not be sufficient
protection for those accused of fraudulent conduct because of the way in which
a prosecuting party proves fraudulent intent.175
In a fraud case, the plaintiff will seldom have a "smoking gun" on the
intent to defraud. Few defendants will admit that they acted consciously to
deceive the victim of the fraud. 176 Instead, the mental element will be proven
inferentially from facts known to the defendant. The fact finder will then be
invited to infer what the defendant must have known." 7x Hence, the bungling
professional who should have known that an asset was overvalued is hard to
distinguish from one who, the jury may believe, had actual knowledge. 178
From the jury's perspective, the difference between fraud and malpractice may
not seem particularly significant: in both cases, the victim is equally harmed.
Given the limited ability to take a case away from the jury,179 the trial court
174 18 U.S.C. § 1341 is explicit that a defendant must have an intent to defraud. See
Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), ceir. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
cf Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896) (identifying the significant fact as
intent and purpose). See generally 2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
IRABIL1TY, § 8:51 (2d ed. Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992).
175 See Blakey et al., supra note 4, at 1082.
176 That would appear obvious in cases reviewed in this discussion. Were the
defendant to admit the fraud, plaintiff would almost certainly be able to move for partial
summary judgment on the question of liability. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979) (upholding motion for partial summary judgment proper because issue of
defendant's false and misleading proxy statement was collaterally estopped).
177 See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
963 (1986); United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1127 (1979); United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Seasholtz, 435 F.2d 4, 8 (10th Cir. 1970). Further, a
number of cases have allowed either a willful blindness or reckless disregard charge. See
United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907
(1988); United States v. Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Massa,
740 F.2d 629, 643 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); United States v.
Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984).
Willful blindness may allow an inference of actual knowledge. See United States v. Jewel,
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); see also BRICKEY, supra note
174, at § 8:51.
178 In some cases, federal courts, while purporting to require knowledge, assume that
knowledge is satisfied if a defendant should have known a fact, hence, treating the objective
negligence standard as the equivalent of the subjective requirement of knowledge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
179 Because of concerns that use of the directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
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will be able to provide the bungling professional with little protection from a
finding that he or she committed fraud. That is, the case would be ripe for
neither a summary judgment nor a judgment as a matter of law. RICO's treble
damages and attorneys' fees provisions, however, are not appropriate for
negligent actors.
A related policy consideration in Reves is the apportionment of damages.
Typical of our system is that defendants who are jointly and severally liable
pay the entire damages if their cohorts are judgment proof.180 That rule has
been targeted by proponents of tort reform because it can produce great
injustice.181 For example, deep-pocket corporate defendants have often
complained that they are left holding the bag for conduct in which their fault is
minor and a more culpable joint tortfeasor is insolvent.' 8 2 The result is that the
solvent defendant pays damages grossly out of proportion with his or her
degree of fault. The problem is especially acute in RICO cases because the
disproportionality between damages and the defendant's fault is magnified
when the damages are trebled.
Had Reves reversed the decision of the lower court, a jury may have found
the auditors' liable in such a case. The Co-op had been run aground by two
men found guilty of tax fraud; 183 the general manager of the Co-op appears to
have drained four million dollars from the Co-op. 184 By comparison, the
auditors may have bungled, but their fault hardly rises to the level of the
general manager's self-dealing. The auditors, however, would be liable for the
entire amount of the judgment, absent other solvent defendants.' 85
The Court's assertion in Reves that the plain language of § 1962(c) was
dispositive meant that the Court did not have to articulate underlying policy
considerations. But the language was not plain' 86 and despite the Court's
confidence that its management or control test was easily applied, Reves has
the verdict may violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, federal courts must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Lavender v.
Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
181 See id at § 886B (1979) (An inferential step may support the proposition, but the
Restatement does not mention tort reform.).
182 See Jay K. Wright, Why Are Professionals Wonied About RICO?, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 983, 992-95 (1990).
183 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1167 (1993).
184 Id.
185 See, e.g., Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1301 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the nature of RICO offenses requires joint and severable liability), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1074 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 742 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(holding that joint and severable liability is consistent with RICO).
186 See supra note 14.
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proved unworkable. Lower courts are in disarray. 187 The Court's analysis in
Reves focused on the peculiar facts of the case without explaining whether the
Court's holding was limited to cases involving omission liability under the
securities laws.
Reves has already generated considerable litigation, especially in cases
involving professional defendants x88 whose professional associations have been
active in lobbying for legislative reform. 189 Much of the confusion spawned by
Reves is a result of the Court's failure to confront hard policy questions that
were present in the case.
VI. REvEs IN THE COURTS
For those eager to see RICO narrowed, Reves is a welcome change. 190
Indeed, many federal courts have found in Reves a broad invitation to limit
RICO. But as argued below, many courts have demonstrated more hostility to
RICO than fidelity to Reves. Two lines of cases are especially troubling: one
line of cases has found in Reves a general immunity for outsiders who are
providers of professional services;1 91 the second line has found in Reves a
requirement that a § 1962(c) defendant must have responsibility for directing
another person. 192
A. Providers of Professional Services
In what may become a significant legal trend, 193 a number of courts have
187 See infra text accompanying notes 194-281.
188 See, e.g., Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 1994); Napoli v.
United States, 32 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1994); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993);
Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341 (9th Cir. 1993); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick
Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991); Sassoon v. Altgelt, 777, Inc., 822 F. Supp.
1303 (N.D. IMI. 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gilmore v.
Berg, 820 F. Supp. 179 (D.NJ. 1993); United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 824 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
189 See Wright, supra note 182, at 984.
190 See stpra text accompanying notes 81-111 (discussing the fact that Reves is the
first case in which the Supreme Court has affirmed the lower federal court's decision in
which it limited RICO).
191 See infra text accompanying notes 193-251.
192 See infra text accompanying notes 252-81.
193 Ralph A. Pitts et al., Ovil RICO and Professional Liability After Reves. Plainf&
Wdl Have to Look Elsewhere to Reach the "Deep Pockets- of Oatside Professionals (Part 2
of2), CIv. RICO REP., Oct. 20,1993, at 1.
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found in Reves support for the proposition that providers of professional
services who can otherwise be characterized as outsiders are beyond the scope
of § 1962(c). The following cases illustrate this trend.
In Bawner v. Pachl, plaintiffs were investors in a California limited
partnership. 194 Emery Erdy and his corporation, Estate Planning Associates,
Inc. (EPA), the organizers of the partnership, were ordered by the California
Department of Corporations to desist public sale of partnership interests
because the transactions amounted to the illegal sale of unregistered
securities. 195 Plaintiffs did not sue EPA or Erdy because EPA and Erdy, were
already in bankruptcy proceedings. 196
Instead, the investors sued the attorney who provided EPA and Erdy with
legal services and they sued a licensed real estate appraiser who appraised the
property in which the plaintiffs had invested. 197 The plaintiffs' RICO claim
against the attorney was based on his representation of EPA and Erdy before
the state agency. Plaintiffs alleged that the attorney attempted to cover up EPA
and Erdy's fraud by mischaracterizing their conduct in correspondence with the
state. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the attorney made false
representations in correspondences to the limited partners. 198 While the
attorney was representing EPA and Erdy in bankruptcy, he allegedly
misrepresented to the limited partners the status of EPA and Erdy's assets in an
effort to discourage legal actions against them. 199
The trial court, relying on H.J. Inc., dismissed the claim against the
attorney because the court found that the plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claim failed to
allege a "pattern of racketeering." 2°° The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court but did so in reliance on Reves, rather than on H.J. Inc.20 1
The Ninth Circuit characterized the complained of conduct in Reves as
"Ernst & Young's preparation of the audit reports, meetings with the Board of
Directors to explain the audits, and presentations at the annual meetings." 2°2
The court analogized the attorney's conduct to that of Ernst & Young: the
attorney held no formal position in the organization, his involvement began
several years after the fraudulent scheme began, and his role was sporadic.2 °3
194 8 F.3d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1993).
195 Id. at 1342.
196 Id. at 1342 n.1.
197 Id. at 1343.
198 Id. at 1342.
199 Id. at 1343.200 Id.
201 Id. at 1344.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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The court described the attorney's role as "limited to providing legal services
to the limited partnership and EPA." 2 4 Reves held, according to the Ninth
Circuit, that whether legal services are rendered "well or poorly, properly or
improperly, is irrelevant to the Reves test." 20 5 Bawner appears to adopt the
general rule that an attorney who is providing legal services does not violate §
1962(c). 206
In Sassoon v. Altgelt, 777, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant law
firm "drafted [a limited partnership] Offering which contained the promise that
investors['] funds would be returned to them if either of two contingencies
were not met." 207 The complaint also alleged additional fraudulent acts
sufficient to support a common law fraud claim for misrepresentation. 208
Despite that, the court dismissed the RICO claim because the law firm's
"conduct consisted of providing legal services to the general partners and to the
limited partnership." 209 According to the district court, a defendant cannot be
found liable under § 1962(c) merely for providing legal services. 210
A final example demonstrates the willingness of courts to use Reves to
exempt professionals from liability under § 1962(c). In Biofeedtrac, Inc. v.
Kolinor Optical Enterprises & Consultants, S.R.L., plaintiff's principal, Dr.
Joseph Trachtman, granted defendant George Jordan's company, Kolinor,
distribution rights for Biofeedtrac's vision training device. 211
Biofeedtrac's complaint alleged that multiple defendants, including
Kolinor, used plaintiff's trade secrets to attempt to manufacture and market a
competing vision device. It further alleged that the defendants concealed the
scheme through multiple acts of mail and wire fraud.212
Plaintiff named Christopher Kuehn, an attorney who had left a New York
law firm to start his own practice with Kolinor as his only client, as a
defendant. According to the complaint, Kuehn represented Kolinor in its
attempt to manufacture its own optical device and informed Jordan of the legal
risks involved in his project. But Plaintiff alleges that Kuehn went beyond
giving what one might reasonably characterize as legal advice when he offered
to create the appearance during negotiations with Biofeedtrac that Kolinor was
eager to distribute the device in order to "mask Jordan's scheme to
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 822 F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (N.D. Ia. 1993).
208 1&
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 832 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
2 12 Id.
1995] 1389
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
manufacture the competing device." 213
During this time, Jordan provided technicians with Biofeedtrac's device so
that they could dismantle it in order to develop their own device. Kuehn was
aware of this work and that this device would infringe Biofeedtrac's patents. 214
To facilitate the project, Kuehn incorporated two companies, named himself to
the companies' boards, and offered to serve as counsel to the two
companies. 215
Biofeedtrac filed its action in April 1990, naming several defendants, and
claiming, inter alia, that the defendants violated § 1962(c). Kolinor was named
as the enterprise.216 According to Biofeedtrac, prior to a hearing in early May
for injunctive relief, Kuehn advised a witness to commit perjury. 217 The court
summarized Kuehn's involvement as follows: Kuehn knew about the fraudulent
scheme to manufacture the vision device; he "advised Jordan how to avoid
detection and to minimize the legal risks of such a scheme... performed
ministerial legal tasks in advancing the project, and advised one participant that
he could mislead this court." 218
The district court dismissed the claim against Kuehn based on its reading of
Reves. The court characterized the issue of the case as whether RICO imposes
liability "on an attorney who provides legal advice and legal services to clients,
intending the advice and services to advance the clients' scheme to defraud." 219
The court supported its holding by adopting Justice Souter's characterization of
the accountants' role in his Reves dissent. 220 Justice Souter argued that the
accountants took on a management responsibility by creating the records that
they then audited, an act that took them beyond the role of independent
accountants. 221 According to the district court, "the Court held, by its silence,
that even when professionals go beyond their customary role," they will not be
deemed to have participated in the "operation or management of the enterprise
itself."222
Conceding that Kuehn was "more intimately connected to the operation of
the alleged enterprise here than the professionals in Reves," 223 the court found
213 Id. at 588.
2 14 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 588-89.
2 18 Id. at 589.
2 19 Id. at 590.
220 Id. at 591.
221 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1176 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
222 Biofeedtrac, Inc., v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F. Supp.
585, 591 (1993).
223 Id.
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that his conduct was confined to giving legal advice and providing legal
services. By comparison, he did not participate in the decision to manufacture
the infringing device or offer business (as opposed to legal) advice.224 His
compensation was limited to fees for legal services. The court dismissed as
within the ordinary role of corporate counsel Kuebn's position as the sole
director and officer for one of the companies that he incorporated. 225
The three cases discussed above are factually distinguishable from Reves
and extend Reves to unintended territory. While Bawner and Sassoon involved
allegations that an attorney actively misrepresented client conduct in order to
cover up the client's fraudulent scheme, Biofeedtrac goes even further. Like the
plaintiffs in Bawner and Sassoon, the plaintiff in Biofeedtrac alleged that the
attorney actively misrepresented facts.226 Beyond that, the plaintiff in
Biofeedtrac alleged that Kuehn acted as a corporate officer, a role often served
by corporate counsel, but not necessarily a position reserved for lawyers. 227
Most damning, however, was the fact that Kuehn allegedly suborned perjury or
attempted to obstruct justice in his efforts to get a witness to mislead the
court.
2 28
Unlike Reves, in which the accountants' "failure to tell the Co-op's
board" 229 was insufficient to create liability, in Bawner, Sassoon, and
Biofeedtrac the lawyers engaged in active conduct in violation of RICO's
predicate offenses. While a professional may not manage, operate, conduct or
participate by inaction, no similar problem arises if one takes affirmative
actions.2 0
Even if Reves is not limited to its facts, cases like Bawner, Sassoon and
Biofeedtrac go too far. These cases have created a bright-line rule for outsider-
professionals who provide services to the enterprise. Reves specifically rejected
such an easy distinction between insiders and outsiders. The Reves Court
recognized that some outsiders may be said to operate or manage the affairs of
the enterprise. 231
Creating an exemption for professionals sets up a questionable double
standard. Cases like Biofeedtrac give professionals a blanket immunity even
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 1& at 587. For example, urging a witness to commit perjury is arguably not even
giving legal advice. The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1988) (subornation of
perjury).
227 Biofeedtrac, Inc., 832 F. Supp. at 591.
228 Id. at 588-89.
229 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173-74 (1993).
230 See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
231 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
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when their conduct violates provisions of § 1962(c). 23 2 By contrast, no
immunity exists for a Mafioso or a business person who commits the same
acts. For example, in Sassoon, if a nonlawyer business person sent out the
same allegedly fraudulent letters, that person would be liable under § 1962(c)
while the lawyer would be exempt even if he or she committed the requisite
predicate offenses and engaged in sufficient acts to meet the "pattern"
requirement as defined in H.J. Inc.23 3
A court might believe a broad exemption for lawyers is justified by a need
to allow the attorney to represent his or her client zealously without fear of
reprisals for that representation. 23 4 Reves may have been concerned about
converting professional misconduct into criminal conduct. 23 5 But such a policy
argument has failed in other contexts. For example, cases have held that an
attorney advising his or her client to plead the Fifth Amendment may be guilty
of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 if the prosecutor can prove the requisite
corrupt intent.23 6 This intent may be established when the attorney advises his
or her client not to testify in order to protect a third party, rather than to protect
232 In some more recent cases, courts have taken a different approach to the problem.
For example, in Napoli v. United States, the Second Circuit found that the lawyer-
defendants conducted the affairs of the law firm through a pattern of racketeering. 32 F.3d
31, 37 (2d. Cir. 1994). Napoli suggests that the result in cases like Bawner, Biofeedtrac,
and S asoon might be avoided by plaintiffs if plaintiffs plead a different enterprise,
specifically, the law firm. See Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (in which professionals, including members of a law firm, were alleged to have
participated in an association-in-fact, consisting of various entities). By implication,
Purdglioti suggests that the result in cases like Bawner might have been different if the
plaintiffs had alleged a different enterprise, an association-in-fact, in which case the lawyers'
conduct may have met Reves' operation or management test.
233 H. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236-41 (1989).
234 In the cases reviewed, defendants other than the providers of professional services
remain liable for the same conduct. See Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F. Supp.
585 (1993).
235 That rationale may sometimes motivate judicial line drawing. See, e.g., Morgan v.
United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1963) (drawing
a distinction between false statements to the court in its administrative as opposed to judicial
capacity for purposes of criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to avoid criminalizing
trial tactics). But see United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (lst Cir.) (rejecting a lawyer's
claim for a special defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstructing justice) and
finding that evenhanded justice requires that lawyers be held to the same standard of
conduct as other defendants), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
2 36 nto/o, 818 F.2d at 990. But see United States v. Herron, 28 F.2d 122 (N.D. Cal.
1928).
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the attorney's client.237
A broad exemption for professionals also flies in the face of congressional
history. As developed above, the Katzenbach Commission identified the
Mafia's modus operandi as including the use of accountants and other
professionals to manage their resources and the use of lawyers to help corrupt
the judicial system.238 The Commission recognized that the Mafia could not
function alone on muscle and murder, but had become truly dangerous because
it had discovered how to gain an appearance of legitimacy by relying on the
technical expertise of professionals. 239
Hence, the court in Biofeederac missed the point when it stated that the
lawyer did not manufacture or decide to manufacture the competing vision
device.240 For example, the Katzenbach Commission described the Mafia as
characterized by its structure and division of labor with some soldiers
performing intimidation and violence and others finding investments to launder
mob money and still other family members bribing politicians and judges.241 If
the allegations in Biofeedtrac were true, the lawyer acted as a consiglieri, a role
within the Mafia's hierarchical structure, occupied by an individual who enjoys
power and influence through the advice he gives other Mafia leaders. 242
Most of the decisions granting immunity to lawyers have dealt with outside
counsel, not corporate counsel. 243 Were corporate counsel to prepare
fraudulent documents in furtherance of the enterprise's business, most courts
would not exempt that lawyer. Corporate counsel would most likely be held
liable because, as the Reves' decision suggests, a case against outsiders is more
difficult to prove than one against a person within the enterprise. 244 Thus, if
the allegedly fraudulent correspondence in Sassoon was prepared by corporate
counsel, the attorneys who prepared the correspondence would apparently not
come within the exemption articulated by the Reves court. Likewise if
corporate counsel obstructed justice by regularly destroying corporate
documents, the fact that the attorneys' conduct may relate to rendering services
237 antolo, 818 F.2d at 992-93.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
239 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
240 Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 832 F. Supp.
585, 591 (1993).
241 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 8.
242 jd at 7.
243 See, e.g., Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341 (9th Cir. 1993); Gilmore v. Berg, 820 F.
Supp. 179 (D.N.L 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Sassoon v.
Algelt, 822 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. III. 1993); United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
244 See, e.g., Sasoon, 822 F. Supp. at 1303. But see Biofeedtrac, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
at 591 (extending protection to an attorney who served as corporate counsel).
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as lawyers would appear to be irrelevant as to whether they violated § 1962(c).
Liability would be unquestionable.
A number of differences may exist between corporate counsel and outside
counsel relating to, for example, whether the attorney has satisfied the pattern
requirement245 or whether he or she has the requisite mens rea. It is hard to
understand, however, why doing the very same act can amount to "conducting
the affairs of the enterprise" if done by corporate counsel but not if done by
outside counsel. The difference must be found elsewhere. 246
Reves does not support a broad reading that extends an immunity to
providers of professional services. 247 Such an immunity contravenes policy and
the legislative history.248 A question therefore remains as to how the Court
might draw a better line when it ultimately returns to the meaning of § 1962(c).
Decisions like Sassoon and Bawner would make sense only if Reves turned on
a concern, unstated by the Court, that RICO was unfairly applied to deep
pocket professionals. 249
Alternatively, many of the cases reading Reves broadly have involved mail
fraud and securities fraud, and have allowed RICO its broadest reach. Mail
fraud federalizes and then trebles damages caused by common law fraud, which
would be actionable only under state law but for RICO. 250 RICO actions based
on securities fraud alter the legal landscape worked out by Congress in a highly
specialized field of securities law, arguably beyond congressional intent. 251 But
if that is the policy underlying Reves, one wonders why only outside
professionals escape liability while other business people are still subject to
liability under RICO.
245 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
246 See infra text accompanying notes 283-368.
2 47 See supra text accompanying notes 138-87.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
249 See supra text accompanying notes 152-87.
25 0 See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
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B. Directing Underlings
Morin v. Trupin demonstrates the protracted litigation that can arise in a
RICO case.252 Morin's tortuous history may explain the frustration some
federal judges feel in dealing with RICO cases. 253
The Morin litigation involved various groups of investors in real estate
limited partnerships syndicated by defendant Trupin through interconnected
companies and partnerships that made the offers to the plaintiff-investors. 254
The plaintiffs alleged that private placement memoranda were fraudulent in
failing to reveal Trupin's involvement. 255 Plaintiffs named as a defendant a
New York law firm alleged to have prepared tax opinions used in the
memoranda. This law firm also represented Trupin in an audit before the
IRS.256
The district court granted the law firm's motion to dismiss. The court's
analysis was broader than in the professional services cases, though closely
related to those decisions. The district court found that "there is no suggestion
that the... defendants ever directed anyone to do anything." 257 The court
recognized that the lawyers may have had "persuasive power to induce
management to take certain actions," but that the power to influence is not
equivalent to the power to direct; in order to impose liability the Reves court
required a power to direct.258
United States v. Altman demonstrates that at least some lower federal
courts are willing to read Reves broadly even in criminal cases. 25 9 The
Surrogates Court of New York County appointed the defendant as an executor
for an estate, a conservator for a mentally incompetent person, and a receiver
for a company. The defendant was accused of having "looted" the estate,
252 823 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
253 The proceedings in this case are many. See Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), reh'g granted, 809 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), on reargument, 823
F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Morin v. Trupin, 832 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Morin
v. Trupin, 799 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Morin v. Trupin, 738 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Morin v. Trupin,
711 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Morin v. Trupin, 728 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
see also Ahmed v. Trupin, 809 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Ahmed v. Trupin, 781 F.
Supp. 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
2 54 Morin, 823 F. Supp. at 203-04.255 Id.
256 Id. at 204.
2 57 Morin, 832 F. Supp. at 98.
2 58 Id. The court also concluded that providing legal services is not within § 1962(c).
259 820 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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conservatorship, and receivership. In a multicount indictment, the government
alleged a violation of § 1962(c). The alleged enterprise was the New York
Surrogates CoUrt. 26 0
The district court dismissed the § 1962(c) count because "there [was] no
suggestion that [the defendant] ever 'directed' anyone else to do anything." 261
The conclusion that one must direct another to meet the Reves test is apparently
grounded in the language in Reves to the effect that § 1962(c) does not extend
"beyond those who participate in the operation or management of an
enterprise." 262
As with the cases creating an immunity for providers of services, Morin
and Altman are at least factually distinguishable from Reves. In an earlier
opinion in Morin, the court found that the complaint alleged sufficient "primary
wrongdoer securities fraud under Rule 10(b)" to withstand a motion to
dismiss. 263 The complaint alleged a variety of omissions among the bases of
liability.2 64 It also alleged a number of affirmative acts committed by the
lawyers, including the preparation of "false and/or misleading tax opinions and
tax information." 265 The complaint also alleged that in preparing a private
placement memorandum, the defendants concealed information from
investors.266
As indicated above, courts construing Reves have typically ignored the
underlying securities fraud theory that the plaintiffs in Reves relied upon. The
underlying theory was that the auditors failed to speak up at the board
meeting.267 The accountants' full audit disclosed how the auditors had valued
the gasohol plan.268 That choice may have been negligent and the auditors'
260 Id. at 795.
261 IJ at 796.
2 62 Id. at 795 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993)). See
Amalgamated Bank of New York v. Marsh, 823 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The
plaintiff bank employed defendant Marsh for over nine years, during which time he was
able to embezzle almost $9 million from the bank. Part of his scheme involved depositing
money to the account of Viva Pancho. According to the plaintiff, Viva Pancho's fraud
consisted of making "material misrepresentations to [plaintiff] by receiving, accepting and
depositing the proceeds of numerous... checks... with knowledge that the checks were
wrongfully procured." Bank of New York, 823 F. Supp. at 217. The court dismissed a
§ 1962(c) claim against Viva Pancho in reliance on Alman's requirement that a § 1962(c)
defendant must actually direct someone else. Id. at 220.
263 Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
264 Id. at 720-21.
265 Id. at 720.
2 6 6 
,d. at 720-21.
267 See supra notes 193-266 and infra notes 268-81.
26 8 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 937 F.2d 1310, 1318 (8th Cir. 1991), aft'd, 113 S. Ct.
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failure to reveal information may have been a breach of their duty, and in
violation of the securities law. By comparison, the plaintiffs in Morin and
Altman alleged active fraud, not a failure to reveal when the duty arose, but the
fraudulent misrepresentations in the private placement memorandum.26 9
The Morin and Altman courts improperly extended Reves to claims of
affirmative misrepresentation. The Reves Court did not impose a requirement
that an outsider, otherwise associated with the enterprise, must direct or have
responsibility to direct others to meet the requirements of § 1962(c). The Reves
Court stated that "'conduct' ... indicates some degree of direction." 270 The
Reves Court also stated that "'participate' [means]-'to take part in.'" 271
Understood together, the terms mean that "RICO liability is not limited to
those with a formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs is required." 272 The Court stated that the "'operation or
management' test expresses this requirement in a formulation that is easy to
apply." 273 The Court also noted that it did not have to decide "how far section
1962(c) extends down the ladder of operation because it is clear that Arthur
Young was not acting under the direction of the Co-op's officers or board." 274
It may be implied that one might be a § 1962(c) defendant if one takes rather
than gives directions, at least insofar as the employer is implementing
managerial decisions.
The Court said that one need not direct another to meet the Reves' test. The
Reves' test is satisfied not only if one manages the enterprise but also if one
operates the enterprise. "Management" may imply that one has responsibility
for directing others. "Operation" does not have a similar meaning; quite the
contrary, "operate" as in "operative" may imply that one is a line worker, not
a manager.275
Further support is found in Reves, where the court held that an outsider
who committed bribery may meet its test: "An enterprise also might be
'operated' or 'managed' by others 'associated with' the enterprise who exert
1163, 1174 (1993).
269 Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711, 720-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v.
Altman, 820 F.Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
27 0 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169.
271 Xd at 1170.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1174
2 75 
"Operative" is defined as a "skilled workman;... an artisan;... a mechanic."
"Operation" is defined as the condition of being in action or at work. WEBSTER'S NEw
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICHONARY 1253 (2d ed. 1983). Reves specifically rejected a
requirement that a § 1962(c) defendant must have significant control or be in the upper
management of an enterprise. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170.
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control over it as, for example, by bribery." 276 If the Court means to suggest
that any person offering a bribe operates or manages the affairs of the
enterprise, cases like Altman and Morin are wrong. One who commits bribery
does not necessarily direct another person. In many bribery situations, the
official who is bribed is doing the directing.277 Even if the briber is not the
party demanding the bribee to perform his or her job, the briber is guilty of
bribery even if the bribee does not change his or her job performance as a
result of accepting the bribe.278 This suggests an element of freedom on the
part of the bribee, in that the briber is guilty of bribery even if the briber has
been entirely ineffective and unable to direct anyone. It is more accurate to
speak of the briber as attempting to influence rather than attempting to direct in
many bribery cases. 279
By comparison, a lawyer in a case like Morin probably has as much
influence over a client as a briber has over an official.280 Likewise, the
defendant in Altman manipulated the surrogate court in its job, just as a briber
expects to manipulate the bribee by paying a bribe.281
VII. PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Reves left more questions unanswered than resolved.282 As argued above,
276
,Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
277 See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 485 (1983); United States v.
Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1978), ceit. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
278 United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 991 (1975).
279 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854, 862-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 947 (1993); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1290 (1993); United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 558-59 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).280 See Jeffrey N. Shapiro, Comment, Attorney Liability Under RICO § 1962(c) After
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1153, 1174 (1994).
281 United States v. Altman, 820 F. Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In fact, the
defendant in Altman is more likely to succeed in his criminal scheme than is the briber. The
briber can succeed only if he is dealing with a corrupt official while the lawyer in Altana
could succeed in his criminal scheme as long as no one discovered the misrepresentations in
the papers filed with the court.
282 Reves has produced considerable confusion among commentators as well as among
courts. For example, two authors believe that Reves represents a significant impairment on a
prosecutor's ability to bring charges against Mafia foot soldiers because "[tihe soldier in an
organized crime finily does not control or manage the affairs of the godfather's
enterprise-the godfather does. The soldier follows orders." Ira H. Raphaelson & Michelle
D. Bernard, RICO and the "Operation or Management" Test: The Potential Chilling Effect
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the Court did not address how other courts should resolve the liability of
professionals who take affirmative steps to assist the enterprise.283 The Court
did not resolve how far down the organizational ladder its holding should be
applied.284 In dicta, the Court suggested that an outsider bribing an insider
could be characterized as conducting the affairs of the enterprise. 285 Despite the
Court's view that its test is clear,286 the Reves' test may be satisfied if a person
has a role in the operation, not just the management, of an enterprise.287
Operation is a potentially expansive concept.
Post-Reves cases have focused on the requirement that a defendant must
manage the affairs of the enterprise. These cases have ignored the more flexible
on Oiminal Prosecutions, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 669, 699 (1994). This interpretation is
supported by Reves, but ignores other aspects of the Reves analysis.
Co-authors G. Robert Blakey and Marc Haefner have argued that liability may attach
even in cases like Reves if a plaintiff relies on principles of conspiracy and aiding and
abetting. See Blakey & Haefiter, supra note 26, at 1, 3-4. But they also proposed a
surprisingly begrudging interpretation of Reves in various business settings when the
enterprise alleged is not an associationin-fact. For example, they proposed that courts should
rely on precedent interpreting the National Labor Relations Act to define Reves' operation
or management test. They urged that the question ought to be whether a person exercised "a
great deal of control" over a fraudulent scheme. Id. at 6. Apart from the obvious problem
of line drawing, the proposed analysis seems to reintroduce the test adopted by the District
of Columbia Circuit, limiting § 1962(c) to those in "upper management," a test explicitly
rejected in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993). Reliance on analogies
from labor law also would appear especially inappropriate in the RICO setting. Given
Congress' long support for union democracy, policy underlying federal labor laws would
militate in favor of drawing a line nearer to upper management with management as
opposed to operational responsibilities. RICO is a different creature than labor law. For
example, the monolithic Mafia, RICO's original target, is hierarchical and dictatorial, doing
its business through loyal underlings.
A thoughtful student comment correctly argued that lower federal courts have
misapplied Reves. See Shapiro, supra note 280, at 1169. The comment argues for a three
factor test to be analyzed to determine if the "legal services are so intimately related to the
operation or management of an enterprise" to satisfy the Reves test: Reves would be
satisfied first, if counsel usurps management responsibility; second, if counsel initiates the
legal services; third, if counsel exercised persuasive power over the client. Id. at 1170-73.
While those would appear to be sufficient to satisfy Reves, this Article has argued that Reves
was narrower than that and may be satisfied on some lesser showing than the one proposed
in the student comment. See supra notes 193-281.
283 See supra notes 147-87.
2 84 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173 n.9.
285 Id. at 1173.
286 Id. at 1170.
287 Id.
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term "operation" in the Reves test. That the underlying offenses in Reves were
based on a failure to act has also been ignored in the post-Reves cases. In doing
so, the lower federal courts may have effectuated some of the policies unstated
in Reves. Post-Reves developments, however, are troubling. One can only
guess what policies the Court may have intended to advance and so one cannot
determine whether those policies are well served by the current rules developed
by the lower federal courts.288
Most of the post-Reves decisions involve civil litigation. 289 There, it may
be tempting to limit RICO's breadth. But interpretations of RICO are fully
applicable in civil and criminal RICO proceedings. 29° Hence, a begrudging rule
in civil RICO cases, articulated out of concern, for example, about rules of
joint and several liability, may come back to haunt a court in a criminal RICO
prosecution. Given that RICO was intended primarily as a criminal statute with
civil liability as an afterthought, 291 narrowing RICO to meet the problems
faced in civil RICO cases may be allowing the civil tail to wag the criminal
dog.
The two lines of cases discussed above292 and the scholarly efforts to limit
the management test to traditional business managers293 are contrary to RICO's
legislative history. Senators McClellan and Hruska, and ultimately Congress,
were heavily influenced by the Katzenbach Commission's report.294 The
Commission identified the structure of the Mafia. The Mafia was defined by its
hierarchy, starting with the Commission overarching twenty-four Mafia
families. 295 The families were organized along identifiable lines of authority,
288 See supra notes 152-87.
289 As of February 1995, 354 cases have cited Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct.
1163 (1993), of which 82 were criminal and 272 were civil. Search of LEXIS, Shepards
(Feb. 4, 1995).
290 Critics claim that RICO encourages frivolous lawsuits because it offers a private
plaintiff the advantages of a federal forum and the prospect of treble damages and attorneys'
fees. See Crovitz, supra note 6, at 65 (stating that RICO offers the lure of treble damages
plus lawyers fees to plaintiffs who bring private actions for damages against private
defendants). See also Tarlow, supra note 3, at 169. One commentator has argued that RICO
ought to be interpreted differently depending on whether it is the basis of a civil or criminal
action. See Bryan T. Camp, Dual Consuction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51
WAsH. & LEEL. REV. 61, 82 (1994).
291 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 707.
2 92 See supra notes 193-281.
293 See Blakey & Haeffier, supra note 26, at 1; see also, Pitts et al., supra note 193, at
1. 2 94 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 673-80.
295 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 7-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 31-
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with I Capo or the Boss at its head, aided by his Underboss or Sottocapo and
the Counselor or Consiglieri. Below these authorities were underbosses,
lieutenants or Capodecina, section chiefs and soldiers.296 The Katzenbach
Commission identified the Mafia's code of conduct for its members which
consisted of rules to govern its membership. 297 The Commission further
described the ritual by which one became a "made man" or member of the
Mafia.298 Subsequently, Congress had in mind a distinct organization with an
identifiable structure. Congress identified a social evil-the amassing of capital
and interference with free competition-that was accomplished by deliberate,
concerted activity by members of a hierarchical organization.299
A prosecutor must be able to criminalize lower echelon members of the
Mafia because the failure to do so leaves junior operatives ready to take over
management positions in the organization. Hence, § 1962(c) is not limited to
those who manage the affairs of the enterprise; it includes those who operate its
affairs through racketeering activity as well.
Reliance on the analogy to the Mafia demonstrates that Congress intended
to criminalize soldiers or lower echelon employees or associates. This Article
has argued that courts have read Reves too broadly by ignoring the fact that the
auditors' predicate offenses were based on omissions and by ignoring the
"operation" part of the Reves' test.3°° Misreading Reves has lead some
commentators to suggest that § 1962(c) may no longer apply to Mafia foot
soldiers. 301
The Court created much of the confusion with inconsistent statements in
Reves.302 It also left unexplored the meaning of "operation," thereby leaving
itself latitude in future RICO cases. This Article does not attempt to give a
single definition of "operation." Instead, what follows are several recurring
situations in which "operation or management" must be given meaningful
content and a proposed analysis relying on both the language of § 1962(c) and
its legislative history.
296 See a
297 See TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 47-50.
298 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54-
56. 299 See Lynch, supra note 2, at 667 (discussing Congress' attempts to define organized
crime); see also TASK FORCEREPORT, supra note 31, at 1-2.
300 See supra notes 193-281.
301 See Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 282, at 699.
302 See infra notes 310-22.
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A. Down The Ladder
Courts have often cited the example of an employee of a large automaker
during working hours, who regularly extorts money from his fellow
workers. 3°3 He is obviously employed by the corporation and is engaging in a
pattern of racketeering. One easy answer for why he is not guilty under §
1962(c) is that the corporation is not engaged in the business of extortion. But
that depends. If corporate management directed lower echelon employees to
extort money, the analysis of the example might change. An example involving
more realistic corporate behavior may make the point more clearly: the same
hypothetical employee may engage in a number of acts of bribery during the
work day. Bribery may be done to advance corporate interests; 3°4 for example,
an environmental protection agency inspector may be bribed to overlook a
violation of federal or local environmental laws. If those acts of bribery are at
the direction of upper management or are done to advance his employer's
business, § 1962(c) would appear to be satisfied.
In the previous example, the defendant was associated with or employed by
the corporation; he engaged in a pattern of racketeering; the affairs of the
enterprise, e.g., selling automobiles, were advanced by the acts of bribery. The
difference between this example and the initial example of the employee merely
extorting money from fellow employees, is best understood in terms of mens
rea. Like the "made man," 305 the second hypothetical defendant has engaged in
criminal activity to advance the interests of the enterprise.
That a person who acts with the purpose of advancing the interests of the
enterprise is guilty under § 1962(c) would appear noncontroversial. 306 What
complicates the issue even if the actor's conduct benefits the organization is
Reves itself. In Reves, the accountants may have remained silent at the Co-op
board meeting in order to prevent revelation about the enterprise's
insolvency. 307 Thus, the Court may have implicitly found that acting for the
303 United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 790 (8th Cir. 1980) (referring to an
employee of General Motors who collected unlawful debts on factory premises). See United
States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
304 See, e.g., United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1290 (1993).
305 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note 39, at 54-
56; MAAS, supra note 33, at 38-39.
306 United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
961 (1981). Even though one may violate § 1962(c) without an intent to benefit the
enterprise, such a desire would appear to be sufficient to meet the "participate in the
conduct" language of § 1962(c).3 07 Reves v. Ernst& Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1167-68 (1993).
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benefit of the enterprise is insufficient without more to violate § 1962(c).
Further, Reves stated that a § 1962(c) defendant must have "some part in
directing the enterprise's affairs." 3° 8 Hence, if an employee bribes an EPA
official at the direction of his superior, one might argue that the employee has
been directed, but has no part in directing the enterprise's affairs.
Again, Reves' unusual facts call for a narrow interpretation of its holding.
While the Court stated that one must have "some part in directing" the affairs
of the enterprise, it also stated that an enterprise's affairs are also within its
operation and management test when "lower-rung participants... are under
the direction of upper management." 3°9 The Court's actual holding involved a
situation in which the Court found specifically that the accountants' "failure to
tell the Co-op's board" additional information did not meet its test.310 The
plaintiffs in Reves did not rely on a claim that the accountants actively
misrepresented the financial status of their client in order to conceal its
insolvency. This Article has argued that the Court simply did not address that
issue and that, should the Court do so, active fraud would come within §
1962(c)'s "conduct" or "participate in the conduct" language. 311
An individual acting to benefit the enterprise and also meeting the pattern
requirement should fall within § 1962(c) whether he or she is formally
employed by an enterprise or only "associated" with the enterprise. Here, a
mens rea requirement, the purpose of benefiting the enterprise, also serves to
establish the association with the enterprise. "Associated" is defined as "united
in company or in interest; joined; accompanying."312 An "association" is,
among other things, a "union," "a society formed for transacting or carrying
on some business or pursuit for mutual advantage"; as a verb, "associate"
means "to unite as friends, partners, etc.; join for a common purpose." 313
Rephrased, § 1962(c) would appear to be satisfied when a defendant, united in
interest with the enterprise, for example, by a desire to advance the interests of
the enterprise, engages in a pattern of racketeering. 314
308 ld. at 1170.
309 Id. at 1173.
310 Id. at 1174.
311 See spra notes 226-51, 268-81.
312 WESTRS N~w UNrVESAL UNABRDGD DICTNARY 113 (2d ed. 1983).
313 Id. For a careful analysis of the mens rea requirement in § 1962(c) see United
States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
314 Whether RICO contains a mens rea requirement has divided lower federal courts.
Barry Tarlow, RICO Revsi'ted, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 383 (1983). For example, some lower
federal courts have held that the only mens rea required for a § 1962(c) violation is the
proof of the mens rea required by the predicate offenses while other courts have required
some additional knowledge or voluntary association with the enterprise. Id. at n.384 and the
cases cited therein.
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One nght argue that the accountants in Reves were united in interest with
the enterprise and were motivated by a desire to further the affairs of the
enterprise by their acts of securities fraud, thereby rebutting the suggestion that
the problem ought to be resolved by reference to a mens rea requirement.
Again, though, the Court found that "it is clear that Arthur Young was not
acting under the direction of the Co-op's officers or board." 315 A different case
would be presented if the accountants and the Co-op members agreed to
misrepresent the Co-op's financial condition.
B. Insiders, Outsiders and Mens Rea
The mens rea analysis would prove especially helpful in cases involving
"outsiders." As discussed above, some courts have found, relying on Reves,
that outsiders providing professional services to an organization are exempt
from liability under § 1962(c).316 Even the Reves Court recognized that, had
the accountants prepared fraudulent documents at the direction of the Co-op
representatives, the Court would have been faced with a different case.317 A
mens rea requirement (e.g., that the defendant act with an intent to advance the
Section 1962(c) does not use a traditional mens rea term, but even if one is not implied
in the terms "associate," "conduct," and "participate," a court might imply a term under
the analysis dictated by the Court. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
Mofissette established two presumptions in cases in which the intent of Congress could not
otherwise be determined. Morissette focused on whether a crime was one at common law,
in which case a mens rea term would almost certainly be read into a statute otherwise silent
on a scienter requirement while no mens rea would be read into a public welfare statute. Id.
at 246, 255, 261, n.21. The problem in RICO is that some of the underlying predicate
offenses are mata in se crimes like murder and robbery while others, like receiving
unlawful union payments under the Taft Hartley Act, are modern regulatory crimes. Even
though not dispositive, the long sentences available for RICO violations, see 18 U.S.C. §
1963 (1982 & Supp. ]I 1984) (penalty provisions), would militate in favor of a finding of
mens rea. Further complicating the Mowissette analysis is the Court's decision in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 399-402 (1948). There the Court found
that a mess rea element should be read into the Sherman Antitrust law. Id. It did so in part
because of concern that a contrary result might over-deter socially desirable business
conduct because a person, operating near the gray area of socially acceptable conduct,
would not know when his or her behavior became criminal. Id. By contrast, people engaged
in continuous criminal acts, as envisioned by Congress when it enacted RICO, would not be
engaged in the arguably gray area between socially acceptable and unacceptable conduct.
Killing rival gang members and extorting money from noncompliant businesses-the modus
operandi of the Mafia-is not close to the line.
315 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 n.9 (1993).
316 See mpranotes 193-251.
317 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173 n.9.
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interests of the enterprise) in conjunction with the pattern requirement makes an
outsider look like an insider. The requirement of continuity found in "pattern"
means that the defendant has associated with the enterprise over a period of
time;318 mens rea demonstrates that the defendant shares the goals of the
enterprise and thus certainly advances the affairs of the enterprise. Focusing on
mens rea avoids artificial line drawing between outsiders who may be liable
and "complete outsiders." 319
Acting to benefit the enterprise through continuous criminal activity would
appear to be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 1962(c). A difficult
question is whether this ought to be a necessary condition of liability. Courts
have recognized that a defendant may be able to commit certain crimes because
he holds a key position within an organization.3 20 A union leader, for example,
may be able to extract a tribute from a shipper who requires the services of
union members under the unionist's control; the leader does not intend to
benefit the union, but instead intends only to line his own pockets.321
Prior to Reves, the Second Circuit gave the broadest interpretation to §
1962(c)'s requirement of "participation in the conduct" of the affairs of the
enterprise. It required either that a person is "enabled to commit the predicate
offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or
control over the affairs of the enterprise" or that "the predicate offenses are
related to the activities of that enterprise." 322 While Reves implicitly rejected
that approach, 323 the unionist example would presumably come within Reves'
management test simply by virtue of the person's management position within
the union.
318 HJ. Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1989).
319 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
320 See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 452 U.S.
961 (1981); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983), cer. denied,
465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
321 Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 199 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
322 Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
323 In Reves, the Court explained its grant of certiorari by reference to the conflict
among lower federal courts. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169. For cases which represent the
conflict, see Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1008 (1983); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639,
913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991); Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986). The
Court adopted Bennett. Courts that have considered the question have found implicit in
Reves a rejection of Scotto's test, presumably on the assumption that Bennett was more
restrictive than the Second Circuit's test. See, e.g., Amalgamated Bank of N.Y. v. Marsh,
823 F. Supp. 209, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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If rank and file members of the union engaged in a pattern of racketeering,
their liability under § 1962(c) might turn, as argued above, on their mens rea
and on whether they were acting under the direction of union officials. 324
Where they were acting on their own behalf, under the Second Circuit
approach, the issue would be whether their predicate offenses related to the
activities of the enterprise.325 Under Reves, the issue is whether their conduct
amounted to operating the enterprise.326 Reves did little to explain the meaning
of "operate," leaving itself ample latitude in defining the sweep of §
1962(c). 327
The appropriate analysis is found in yet another court's interpretation of §
1962(c), that of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cauble.328 Cauble, in
effect, cojoined Scotto's disjunctive requirements. Thus, an actor conducts the
activities of the enterprise when he is able to commit the offense by virtue of
his position and the offenses related to the activities of the enterprise.329 For
example, an employee who works for a governor and has responsibility for
reviewing grants of clemency and misrepresents that the governor will grant
clemency, if bribed, would be within the provisions of § 1962(c). The test has
the benefit of limiting application of § 1962(c) in cases in which a mail clerk in
an enterprise committed a pattern of racketeering only remotely related to the
enterprises' business activity.330 If, for example, a mail clerk in a governor's
office misrepresented himself as having the power to review clemency
petitions, he would not appear to meet the conjunctive test.
Cases would fall into two general categories: (1) a defendant would come
within § 1962(c), whether an insider or outsider, if he or she had the requisite
mens rea to benefit the enterprise by committing the predicate offenses; 331 or
(2) a defendant would be liable under § 1962(c) even if he or she acted contrary
to the interests of the enterprise, the affairs of which he or she conducted, if he
or she was able to commit the offenses because of his or her position in the
enterprise and the predicate offenses were related to the activities of the
enterprise.332
3 24 See supra notes 303-15.
325 scoto, 641 F.2d at 54.
326 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1173.
327 See supra notes 129-36, 275-81.
328 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). Despite the
fact that Cauble predates Reves, this Article contends that adoption of its approach is not
foreclosed by Reves because the Court has yet to determine RICO's mens rea requirement.
329 ld. at 1332.
330 Id. at 1332 n.22.
331 See supra notes 303-19.
3 32 See supra notes 320-30.
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C. Bribers After Reves
Even though the proposed analysis would extend § 1962(c) liability beyond
that found in some of the post-Reves cases, it would also limit § 1962(c) in
some recurring cases. One example is found in United States v. Yonan in which
the defendant Yonan, a defense attorney, repeatedly bribed a member of the
state's attorney's office in exchange for favorable treatment for his clients.333
The Seventh Circuit held that Yonan was properly charged under §
1962(c), rejecting Yonan's argument that he was not employed by or associated
with the enterprise because he acted to "undennine the office and thus had no
interest in its goals." 334 The court found no express statutory requirement that
a person have a stake or interest in the goals of the enterprise. The court
concluded that by giving a "common sense" reading of "association," a person
"can associate with the enterprise by conducting business with it." 335
A common sense reading of association is questionable. For example, an
association is defined as a "partnership[,] ... union or connection of ideas." 336
Yonan may have had a union, partnership or conspiracy with a corrupt state's
attorney, but he did not have a connection of ideas with the state's attorney's
office.
Despite the Court's dicta in Reves, suggesting that its test may be met in
bribery cases, 337 it is hard to understand how a defendant like Yonan managed
or operated the state's attorney's office. He had no management position. At
most, one might argue that he "operated" the enterprise by influencing a
decision maker in that organization-a far cry from having a part in directing
the affairs of the enterprise. If "operate" means only to have some effect on the
enterprise, the Second Circuit's test in Scotto, presumably rejected by Reves,
would be resuscitated. 338 Furthermore, if that were the standard, the
accountants' inaction had some effect on the affairs of the Co-op. Had the
accountants spoken at the first board meeting, the Co-op would have had a run
on its demand notes, forcing it into bankruptcy as much as a year earlier.339
Thus, if to "operate" means only "to have an effect on," the accountants would
have been liable under § 1962(c).
Reves does little to explicate the meaning of "operate," other than by
333 800 F.2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
334 Id. at 167.
335 Id.
336 WEsTR's NmVUv AL UNAB DICTIONARY 113 (2d ed. 1983).
337 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993).
33 8 See supra note 323.
339 Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168.
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implication. The accountants, whose silence had an effect on the enterprise, did
not "operate" the enterprise. Reves attempted to limit § 1962(c)'s broad sweep.
Cauble's twin requirements impose a meaningful limitation on § 1962(c) and
would force the Court to reexamine its casual dicta that one engaging in bribery
may conduct the affairs of the enterprise.340 Under Cauble, a briber's conduct
was related to the activity of the enterprise, but the briber was not able to
commit the acts of bribery by virtue of his position in the enterprise.
This comports with the discussion of bribery in the Katzenbach
Commission's report. The report identified the Mafia's use of bribery to
corrupt the system by gaining control over politicians, judges, and police.341
But in that context, a Mafioso conducted the affairs of the Mafia, not the
judge's or politician's office, through a pattern of racketeering. 342
By analogy, Yonan may have operated his own law practice through a
pattern of racketeering. That places no strain on the language of § 1962(c). One
might question, given that the briber may be guilty under § 1962(c) as long as
the right enterprise is pled, that the difference is form over substance. But there
are meaningful differences between being charged with operating one enterprise
or another.
That difference can be illustrated by reference to United States v.
Manzella.343 In Manzella, "Junior" Provenzano was the "kingpin of a
Louisiana crime organization." 344 His organization consisted of several men
who regularly engaged in criminal acts, including arson for hire, extortion, and
mail fraud. 345 Provenzano was indicted, but most of his regular cohorts were
not.346 Instead, his codefendants included a number of people who purchased
Provenzano's organization's services. For example, one defendant, "suffer[ing]
many marital difficulties, resolved to end his problems by destroying the
property of his estranged wives." 347 Provenzano's group agreed to commit two
340 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984).
341 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6; Cressey, supra note 39, at 25.
342 There has been an active debate whether RICO is limited to organized crime.
Blakey & Perry, supra note 92, at 862. But no one doubts that RICO was designed to
outlaw the Mafia; that was the classic "enterprise" within the meaning of RICO. And as
indicated, one way in which the Mafia conducted its affairs was through a pattern of
bribery. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6.
343 782 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986).
344 Id at 536.
345 Id
346 Provenzano's regular cohorts were not tried as codefendants. According to the
court, most of them had cooperated with the government and appeared as prosecution
witnesses. Id. at 544.
347 Id. at 536.
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acts of arson.348 Another codefendant had the group bum down a building so
that he could defraud his insurance company,349 while yet another codefendant
had Provenzano's men "steal" his car, also to collect insurance proceeds. 350
Provenzano's "customers" were charged with violating § 1962(c); the
enterprise alleged was the Provenzano organization. 351 As a result, each
customer was forced to go to trial with the other customers in a long and
complex proceeding.352 Group trials have obvious disadvantages and potential
for prejudice, including the risk of guilt by association and jury confusion.353
The defendant's ability to defend effectively is limited by the significant legal
fees associated with a trial that may last weeks or months. 354 The alternative
would be to charge each individual customer with operating the affairs of a
different enterprise, one consisting of the individual defendant and the
Provenzano group, an association-in-fact. 355 In that case, there would be no
basis upon which the government could join all of the customers in a single
case.
The prosecutor gained legal advantage in a case like Manzella by the
prosecutor's ability to charge the individuals with operating the affairs of
Provenzano's enterprise. For example, that enterprise had a distinct existence
348 Id.
349 l
350 I In this last instance, the court recognized that the defendant did not engage in a
pattern of racketeering activity insofar as he agreed to the commission of only one predicate
offense. In the case of the other codefendants, the case was resolved before HJ. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1985). Under H.J. Inc., it might be argued that
the defendants did not engage in a pattern of racketeering because, on the specific facts of
the case, the criminal conduct was not sufficiently continuous. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 250.
351 Manzella, 782 F.2d at 536.
352 RICO trials can be exceedingly long. Tarlow, supra note 3, at 169. RICO's
complexity is suggested by the copious scholarly interest and the large number of issues that
have divided lower federal courts. ILd. In Manzella, for example, the court made references
to some of the difficult and unresolved questions arising under RICO's complex provisions.
Manze/!a, 782 F.2d at 537-38 n.2 (discussing the "fascinating conundrum" raised by
charging a § 1962(d) conspiracy while relying on predicate offenses involving acts of
conspiracy).
353 See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v.
Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (Sth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); United
States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
3 54 In RICO prosecutions, this problem may be compounded by having assets frozen
because they may be subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600,
602-06 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619-22
(1989).
355 Manzella, 782 F.2d at 538.
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from the pattern of racketeering activity. 356 Were the government instead to
charge each individual defendant with operating a separate enterprise, an
association-in-fact along with the members of the Provenzano group, there
would appear to be no separate proof of the enterprise and the pattern of
racketeering. Subsequently, the evidence would probably be insufficient
because the Court has suggested that in cases involving an association-in-fact,
there must be some proof of an enterprise beyond commission of the predicate
offenses. 357 Charging each enterprise separately might also demonstrate a lack
of continuity to constitute a pattern of racketeering. 358
D. austomers and Reves
Manzella is also illustrative of another group of cases in which the analysis
proposed in this Article might produce a result different from current case law.
In Manzella, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a customer in an
enterprise may not be charged under § 1962(c). 359 The Court observed that a
customer may engage in a pattern of racketeering and "[o]nce this is
established, his status as a customer becomes irrelevant because Congress
intended the prosecution of anyone whose actions fall afoul of § 1962(c)." 360
The Court glossed over the question of whether a customer's actions run afoul
of § 1962(c). They do run afoul of § 1962(c) but only if § 1962(c) is satisfied
by the commission of two predicate offenses. It is widely recognized that, this
alone, is insufficient. 361
Applying Reves to the "customer" argument demonstrates some of the
uncertainty of its test. A customer may or may not have a role in "directing"
the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. The purchase of arson services has
an effect or influences the activity of the enterprise. Whether that is sufficient
to meet the Reves test is doubtful. 362
Under this proposed analysis, the customer lacks the mens rea to advance
356 An association-in-fact, composed of individuals whose only relationship was the
commission of the relevant predicate offenses, might not be liable under RICO. That is due
to the suggestion in Twkette that the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering were separate
elements and that something in addition to the pattern of racketeering was necessary to
demonstrate the existence of the enterprise. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576,
583 (1981).
3 5 7 Id. at 583.
3 58 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232 (1989).
3 59 Manzella, 782 F.2d at 538.
360 Id
361 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. See Tarlow, supra note 314, at 346-47.
3 62 See supra notes 337-42.
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the interests of the enterprise. 363 Hence, the question would be the extent to
which the customer is enabled to commit the predicate offenses by virtue of his
or her position in the enterprise. Concededly, the second part of the test would
be met if the predicate offenses relate to the activities of the enterprise. The
"customer" in a case like Manzella has no position in the enterprise. He or she
may have importance for the enterprise; but by analogy to customers of any
commercial venture, it would not be said of Sears' customers that they have a
position in Sears.
That conclusion is supported by an understanding of the workings of the
Mafia. The Mafia notoriously sells "protection" to various people.364 In the
construction trade, it may sell labor peace,365 or it may provide a customer an
alternative to lengthy contract litigation.366 For example, a subcontractor on a
construction project may have difficulty collecting fees from the contractor.
The Mafia often provides the contractor with incentive to pay off the
subcontractor. There is no indication that Congress would sweep those parties
into a prosecution along with members of the Mafia.367
Efforts to limit RICO to organized crime cases have been unsuccessful, 3 68
rightly so given that Congress specifically recognized that RICO would not
apply exclusively to organized crime.369 But Congress' preoccupation with the
Mafia offers relevant legislative history; organizations or individuals whose
conduct has no resemblance to the Mafia seem doubtful targets for its draconian
remedies. The virtue of the analysis proposed in this Article is its effort to pose
some rational boundaries for § 1962(c), resembling classic Mafia activity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Reves held that the accountants' failure to reveal information, a violation of
a duty under the securities law, did not amount to a violation of § 1962(c). 370
The reaction of some commentators 371 and lower federal courts372
363 See supra notes 300-32.
364 See generally GOLDSTOCK, supra note 39, at 16-17.
365 Id.
366 d. at 20. See generally Michael Vitiello, The Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations Report on Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International Union.:
Wdl RICO Take a Walk on the Boardiwalk with Local 54?, 16 RuTGER s J. 671 (1985).
367 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 16; Cressey, supra note 39, at 32.
36 8 HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989).
3 69 See Lynch, sura note 64, at 773.
37 0 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1174 (1993).
371 Pitts et al., supra note 157, at 1.
372 See supra notes 193-281.
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demonstrates frustration with RICO in the business setting in which RICO
plaintiffs have sought deep pocket defendants.
Like many commentators and lower federal courts, the Supreme Court may
finally have seen the shortsightedness of its earlier RICO decisions in which the
Court refused to impose any meaningful limitations on RICO's expansive
language. For example, Sedima, the case that most deeply divided the Court,
offered an opportunity to limit RICO in cases involving garden variety common
law fraud, often disputes about soured business deals, not about the kind of evil
that produced RICO.373 The Court's failure to do so has increased the pressure
to limit RICO.374
This Article has argued that Reves may reflect concern about the same
policies that troubled the Sedima dissenters. 375 Given the Court's deference to
stare decisis in statutory construction cases, 376 the Reves court was not in a
position to reexamine limitations rejected in Sedima. But the Court's failure to
articulate its policy concerns has meant that post-Reves cases have been
confusing.377
Contrary to the view among several lower federal courts,378 Reves did not
create a broad immunity for professionals. 379 Such an immunity would be
contrary to congressional intent.380 Congress recognized that the Mafia was
able to maintain economic power through the use of professionals. 381 RICO
was designed to reach men like Lucky Luciano382 who could maintain control
by directing others to commit predicate offenses. But RICO was intended to
strike at the heart of organized crime, a goal which could not be accomplished
by incarcerating only managers. Young muscle would remain ready to ascend
to management positions.383
This Article has argued that Congress' intent, expressed in § 1962(c), can
be achieved by focusing on the mens rea requirement and whether the actor's
position in the organization makes the commission of the crime possible.384
Reves does not foreclose what this Article has argued is a natural reading of §
373 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 525 (1985).
374 See supra notes 93-113.
375 See supra notes 152-89.
376 See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
377 See supra notes 193-281.
378 See supra notes 193-251.
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 See supra notes 41-46.
3 82 See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-10; Cressey, supra note
39, at 54-56.
383 See supra notes 33-46, 63-67, 294-99.
384 See supra notes 303-32.
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1962(c). 385
With its decision in Reves, the Court has addressed most of RICO's
substantive terms. It has resolved neither the mens rea question, an issue that
would permit a more natural reading of § 1962(c) than that given by post-Reves
decisions, nor the meaning of operation in its "operation or management" test.
But given that the Court has addressed most of RICO's substantive provisions
to date, the Court has little maneuvering room to produce meaningful
limitations on runaway RICO.
In that sense, Reves was a step in the right direction. Despite the Court's
urging, Congress has been unable to reform RICO. The Court should take
what few opportunities it will have to limit RICO, but doing so in a manner
consistent with Congress' clear intent to fight the Mafia.
385 See supra notes 301-69.
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